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# PARLIAMENTARY LIFE

KOČA POPOVIĆ

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

## For Peace, Freedom, Independence and Equal Rights



*The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federal Council of the Federal Assembly held its first session on May 4, under the presidency of Vladimir Popović. The agenda included the report of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Koča Popović, on the results of President Tito's visit to Turkey, as well as other relevant problems of Yugoslav foreign policy. Having heard the report of the Foreign Secretary, in which the results of the President's visit to friendly Turkey were set forth, and the general lines of Yugoslav foreign policy elucidated, in the discussion that followed, the members of the Committee expressed their agreement with the efforts of the Federal Executive Council for the achievement of a firm peace, freedom and equal rights in this part of the world, in the spirit of the UN Charter. The members of the Committee were unanimous in their approval of the constructive endeavours of the Federal Executive Council, both in the field of the consolidation of Balkan unity, and in the promotion of genuine European cooperation.*

*The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Koča Popović, submitted the following report which we quote in extenso:*

„I gladly comply with the request of the President of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Comrade Vladimir Popović, to set forth the results of President Tito's visit to Turkey and examine some other relevant questions of foreign policy. I hope that we shall hold such meetings in the future also, as they will undoubtedly facilitate the proper orientation of the work of this Committee and of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs.

On his return from Turkey, President Tito in fact submitted a report to our whole people. In his speeches the President actually revealed the essence of all we have seen in Turkey and the gist of our conversations with the President of friendly Turkey, Celal Bayar, the Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, the Foreign Minister, Köprülü, and other prominent statesmen. It should therefore not be expected that I shall reveal any new moments, with which you are not more or less acquainted already.

Although President Tito has already stated on several occasions that the receptions extended by the Turkish statesmen and people surpassed all his expectations, I consider it necessary to reiterate it once again on this occasion. This welcome, convinced us still further that the Turkish statesmen attribute an equally great importance to the Ankara Agreement and cooperation with Yugoslavia, as we do to collaboration with Turkey and Greece. We were also convinced that the confidence and prestige enjoyed by our country and peoples in Turkey fully correspond to the confidence and prestige which Turkey enjoys in our country.

### FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF TRIPARTITE COOPERATION

The visit of President Tito to friendly Turkey, which will soon be followed by a visit to the other friendly partner, — Greece, coincided with a series of important in-

ternational events, and it is understandable that a meeting of the President with such distinguished statesmen could not have been limited to a mere courtesy visit.

The talks held with the Turkish statesmen confirmed the identity of views on all questions of vital importance regarding the relations between the two countries and their cooperation within the framework of the Ankara Agreement. Neither our friends nor we regard mutual cooperation and the Ankara Agreement as a temporary expedient, conditioned by a momentary need. They fully share our opinion that Graeco-Turkish-Yugoslav cooperation should continue to develop as a factor of lasting and vital interest to all three countries. We have been convinced that in Turkey, just as here, such a policy enjoys the solid and vigorous support of the broadest strata of the people and their strong army.

During a period slightly exceeding one year this cooperation has shown an extraordinarily successful progress and acquired ever richer content in all fields. Therefore the question arose of embracing and expressing this rich new content by a corresponding new form. In considering the results and the progress of tripartite cooperation so far, we have agreed that this cooperation has advanced so much in all spheres that there is no reason why the agreement should not be raised to a formal alliance. Needless to say, it was not possible to reach any final decision on the subject owing to the absence of the third partner — Greece. Bearing in mind the importance attributed to tripartite cooperation by the Greek statesmen, as well as their attitude towards the need for its further development, we believe that they will agree with the Turkish and Yugoslav views.

The Yugoslav relationship towards NATO was another topic of discussion during the talks. Just as we understand the obligations which ensue for Greece and Turkey from



their membership in NATO, the Turkish statesmen showed complete understanding for the reasons which follow from our specific position, and which prevent us from joining NATO. They expressed their conviction, which fully coincides with our views, that this circumstance will not in the least influence our determination to cooperate in defence from aggression.

While on the subject I should like to say a few words on some reactions provoked by the Yugoslav-Turkish statement that conditions are ripe for the raising of the Ankara Agreement to an alliance. There were certain attempts to abuse and misinterpret some formulations, which were perhaps stated with insufficient clarity, by quoting them out of context. I refer here primarily to the reaction of our neighbour on the other side of the Adriatic. It seems to me that one could and should expect some Italian politicians at least to draw the necessary conclusions from the numerous Yugoslav constructive efforts and tokens of goodwill, even where the most delicate questions of our mutual relations are concerned, and thus offer realistic and constructive support to the so necessary consolidation of peace in this part of the world. After we expressed our determination to continue with our support of the cause of peace and security through the Ankara Agreement, some Italian papers and their propaganda apparatus again launched a feverish and futile campaign to represent our motives and intentions in a false light. By so doing they found themselves in a very awkward position indeed. As pointed out by President Tito in his Beograd speech, Italian propaganda has asserted hitherto that our policy of cooperation with the neighbouring countries and the West in general is only a manoeuvre. Now, when it has been practically demonstrated that this is untrue and that we are prepared to assume new obligations, their nervousness has increased, they demand a controlling voice in everything, and it has become clear to the world at large that such an Italian policy is completely unrealistic and disruptive, and therefore unable to enlist the sympathies of world public or those of the Italian people whose rightful interests it can only harm by adopting such a line of conduct. It should be hoped that this will soon be realized in responsible Italian quarters.

We also exchanged opinions with the Turkish statesmen on other important international problems. These talks were marked by complete mutual confidence and sincerity in the expression of views. We acquainted our Turkish friends with our assessment of the present international developments. I will deal with this subject in the second part of my report.

Concluding this part of my short survey, which refers directly to the visit of President Tito to Turkey, I think that the results of this visit can be summed up as follows: the visit contributed to the further promotion of friendly relations between Turkey and Yugoslavia, it marks a new important step in the development of tripartite cooperation, and represents potent contribution to the consolidation of peace and security in this part of the world, hence also to the efforts and determination of all freedom-loving peoples to resist aggression and insure peace by common effort.

#### CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

I would now turn to some other questions of our foreign policy which are closely connected with the appraisal of international developments in general, and Europe in particular.

There can be no doubt that important changes in international relations took place during the past year. Roughly speaking, a certain abatement of international tension was registered, the danger of war lessened, and prospects for a more lasting peace increased. This is best testified by the fact that such recent events as the war in Korea, the blockade of Berlin, military demonstrations on our frontiers etc. have been replaced by a series of international conferences.

The Berlin conference played a positive role, in spite of the fact that it failed to resolve a single problem on its agenda. It revealed, notwithstanding the absence of immediate results, that the general balance of power between the two blocs has changed in favour of the West, and that a certain equilibrium has thus been established, enabling the „cold war“ — which can be continued ad infinitum without breaking out into open conflict — to be replaced by an armed peace, i. e. the quest for solution or at least a „modus vivendi“ at joint conferences. The fact that the UN succeeded in checking open warfare in one of its main focus points, Korea, also exerted a similar influence.

The only potential danger of such conferences with a limited number of delegates is that they might gradually undermine the role of UNO, without whose participation and authority no lasting and efficient solution of the outstanding international problems and the improvement of the general international situation is possible. We firmly hope, however, that such an eventual tendency will not prevail.

The Geneva conference is still under way. I think that any forecasts regarding its results would still be premature. However, even if the conference fails to reach agreement on the solution of the Korean problem, it is vital that the Armistice should be preserved, pending more favourable conditions for an agreement.

In our opinion the second point on the agenda of this conference, namely the problem of Indochina, is essentially different from the Korean problem. This is a conflict which has assumed the form of civil war and, as such, is invested with undeniable elements of an anti-colonial and liberation struggle. Although it cannot be affirmed that this conflict is free from foreign interference, the primary objective — if it is already impossible to achieve the cessation of further bloodshed — is to prevent this intervention from assuming the form of open assistance in the form of troops and large quantities of war material.

#### OUR RELATIONS WITH THE EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

Apart from the Berlin and Geneva conferences there exist a series of other facts and portents which indicate and influence the easement of international tension. The UN Disarmament Commission has begun work. Talks on the use of atomic power for peacetime purposes have been initiated between the USA and USSR. The representations of the Eastern and Western European countries convened under the auspices of the European Economic Commission for the purpose of examining the possibilities of the increase of trade exchange, etc.

Thus in this general framework, certain positive changes have also occurred in our relations with some of the East European countries. The process of normalisation of our relations with these countries has been thus initiated. It is true that this process is developing very slowly. With some of the Eastern countries it has not yet even begun. But still the situation on our frontiers is more tolerable than it was a short time ago. There are no obstacles on our side for the further normalisation of our relations with these countries. We do not preclude the possibility of eventual benefit from mutual economic relations. However, the slowness with which this process is evolving indicates that considerable time may still elapse before our relations with the Eastern countries reach the limit to which we are prepared to go, i. e. completely normal and correct interstate relations.

While on the subject of the slackening of tension, however, it is necessary to stress that the realization that aggression would be too risky in a given moment, and the adoption of a policy based on the right of the peoples to independence and equal rights are two entirely different propositions.

Under such conditions, the belief that every possibility of aggression has been eliminated would constitute a dangerous illusion. The elimination of the threat of war which still looms over the peace in which we live, and the achievement of a real and lasting peace, will require immense efforts and perseverance, and the profiting of all possibilities to devise negotiated settlements of international problems, and on the other hand necessitate the strengthening of the defence power of the peace-loving countries.

In any case we cannot be accused of having failed to make a substantial contribution to the strengthening of peace and international cooperation so far. We have devoted immense efforts and made great sacrifices to build up our defence. Together with our Greek and Turkish friends, we have concluded the Ankara Agreement, which has already contributed to the stabilisation of general conditions and peace in this part of the world, and represents a serious obstacle and warning to any aggressor. Apart from this, we have expressed our willingness to cooperate with all those whose aim is to prevent aggression. We have, finally, displayed maximum activity in UNO, and have strictly adhered to the principles of the Charter in all our actions.



## OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EDC

I will not repeat our standpoint regarding this question, as it has been clearly stated by President Tito in his recent speeches and interviews. I will only try to elucidate the motives and essence of this attitude.

In the present international situation, where the danger of war is still present although the prospects for peace have increased, it is important to profit by all ways and means which may lead to the consolidation of peace. In view of the importance of European security to the world at large, and Yugoslavia being an European country, we are deeply interested in the preservation of peace in Europe, particularly in view of a series of important unsolved problems in Europe which might easily result in a renewal of international tension. Europe is still divided into East and West. There are no prospects that the USSR would be willing to abandon a single one of its acquired positions in the foreseeable future. Germany is still disunited and Austria still occupied. One should not forget the difficulties encountered by the West European countries in their efforts to organise their defence, which are due primarily to the lack of mutual confidence among some of these countries. Economic difficulties, which are devoid of any immediate and favourable prospects for their solution in the present international situation and the existing forms of international cooperation, play a particularly important part in most European countries.

However, in spite of all its inherent contradictions, Europe constitutes a geographical, economic, and cultural entity. Mutual cooperation on the broadest possible basis between the European countries is the best way to achieve the solution of all European problems. Besides, this cooperation is the only efficient way to absorb and channel the dynamism of certain European peoples, which led to aggression and expansionisms in the past. Comprised within the framework of general cooperation in Europe, this dynamism would become an important factor of political and economic independence, i. e. her life force, enabling her to function as an organised, strong and peace loving community.

We should assess the various forms of present cooperation and integration of the West European countries, and determine our attitude towards them according to the extent of their contribution to European security, their influence on the settlement of outstanding European problems, and their role as an element of future general European cooperation. Basing our standpoint on this constructive criterion, in spite of our definite attitude towards EDC, we still retain certain reservations which were set forth clearly and openly by President Tito.

The difficulties encountered in the creation of EDC in the form envisaged so far may give rise to serious doubts as to its future efficiency. It would seem, judging by all the symptoms, that so high a form of cooperation as integration is so important and sensitive a question as joint defence demands radical previous preparations in the sphere of general mutual relations between the participants. It would seem therefore that the prospects for the realisation of EDC and its efficient functioning would be far more favourable if mutual confidence and consciousness of community of interests were previously achieved among the participating countries through various forms of cooperation in different fields and on various concrete issues.

I should like to add the following: although we are historically connected with Europe as a European country and should give our contribution to all efforts conducive to the strengthening of European security, and the promotion of cooperation between European countries, we must be aware that Europe and her countries will only be assured a prosperous and secure development in close cooperation with the countries of Asia, America and other continents. This cooperation will be successful and fruitful only in case it develops according to the principles of the UN Charter.

As is known, this attitude of ours towards European problems called forth a positive reaction and correct interpretation by the world public and political factors, except in those cases where narrow selfish interests enjoy absolute priority, where an unreasonable and unfavourable attitude towards everything Yugoslav is adopted in advance, particularly when anything which enhances the prestige of our country is in question.

It is necessary, in this light, to explain how mistaken are all those who affirm or believe that our present activities and decisions are dictated by some alleged dire necessity (as these few would apparently desire). It is otherwise incomprehensible why it is necessary for someone to be „at one's beam ends“ before adopting a line of policy

which so obviously corresponds to the general interest and one's own. It is still less understandable why one should not do so when not „at one's beam ends“. Such an attitude will doubtless not take the authors of this analysis very far.

## NEW CONDITIONS ENABLE EUROPEAN COOPERATION ON A BROADER BASIS

As for those (mainly benevolent) commentators who have interpreted this attitude as a „turning point“ in our policy, I think that they are mistaken. That is, the international situation and relations themselves reached a turning point, so that our present attitude towards European problems is only new in so far as it represents the application of the fundamental principles of our foreign policy to these comparatively new circumstances.

These principles are generally known: peace, freedom, independence and equal rights.

We have already tried to explain the main characteristics of the new circumstances; perhaps these explanations should still be enlarged a little.

At the same time, another fact revealed clearly by the Berlin Conference (which could have been presumed in advance) is that there are no prospects for the unification of Germany, as the necessary preconditions, including the interests of the great powers, do not exist. Owing to these developments it has become impossible to continue holding Western Germany under a special regime of limited sovereignty, thus necessitating allowances to be made for her rearmament, at least within certain limits, i. e. for defence purposes. When the urgent problem of investing Germany with equal rights could not be resolved within the framework of a general discussion on disarmament, namely, the reduction and limitation of present armaments, which was the best possible way of enabling her unification the only alternative was to do this within the European framework — the one remaining constructive solution.

If the problem of granting Germany equal rights with the other European countries, which arose in connexion with the form of her admission to EDC, formerly constituted an obstacle for the achievement of her own unity, today it is evident that these difficulties lie elsewhere. If the formerly contemplated equality of rights, in view of the other circumstances (primarily the fact that military integration enjoyed more or less absolute priority) could have contained a danger of resurgent militarism and the desire for vengeance in Germany, today, in the new situation, there exist genuine conditions for the elimination of this danger (and the achievement of the desired results in the military sphere). Needless to say, it is only possible to consider matters in this light because of the immediate danger, i. e., the objective possibility of forcible annexation by Eastern Germany has been greatly reduced.

All this opens new prospects, and should create the necessary time and atmosphere to devise an acceptable solution of the present differences between the European countries, primarily Germany and France.

It is on such an appraisal that the Yugoslav Government bases its standpoint towards the problem of cooperation between the European countries, and EDC in particular.

Consequently, the fact that the easement in international tension has only begun, in addition to the fact that the danger of aggression has not been definitely eliminated, enables and demands a broader approach to cooperation and the coordination of aspirations and interests, i. e., the elimination of antagonisms between the European countries.

The advantages and benefits of Europe organised on such a basis would offer to the European countries and the world in general are so clear and obvious that we would consider it wrong if we were not to take part, according to our possibilities, in the efforts which are directed towards the achievement of this goal.

Thus organised and united, Europe would be capable of resisting aggression if necessary, and would also be in a position to participate fully and actively in the consolidation and strengthening of peace. Needless to say, such a united Europe must also necessarily include the FPRY.

## UNANIMOUS ATTITUDE OF THE COMMITTEE

In the discussion that followed the speech of the Foreign Secretary, Koča Popović, the members of the Committee assessed the development of relations with friendly



Turkey and Greece as an important and positive factor in the strengthening of world peace. The people's deputy Đuro Pucar, stressed that good relations and a firm alliance in the Balkans at the same time represent a substantial contribution to the preservation of world peace. Referring to the unfavourable attitude of Italy towards the Balkan alliance, Đuro Pucar declared that this policy of the government in Rome was devoid of all moral foundation, and that a change of orientation which would aim at the establishment of peace-loving and good relations both with Yugoslavia and towards the Balkan Agreement would constitute a realistic approach to the achievement of good neighbourly relations, this being in the interests of both peoples. Analysing the reasons underlying Italian hostility towards the alliance between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey, the people's deputy, Josip Vidmar, pointed out that some people in Italy were still deluded by various dreams about the establishment of Italian domination in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, which is contrary to the spirit of the time and the UN Charter. „We really do wish, stated Josip Vidmar, „that Italy would abandon these daydreams once and for all“. The members of the Committee, Mile Počuča and Nikola Kovačević, stressed the necessity for the further broadening and strengthening of Yugoslav-Graeco-Turkish cooperation in the economic, cultural, educational and other fields.

The Chairman of the Committee, Vladimir Popović, analysed the reasons for the antagonistic attitude adopted by the rulers of the Eastern European countries towards tripartite cooperation in the Balkans, stressing that their attacks against Balkan cooperation indicated the real character of their policy. Having emphasised that cooperation

with Turkey and Greece contributed to the restoration of the balance of military power in the Balkans, which was disturbed by the steady Soviet rearmament of the limitrophe Eastern European countries, Vladimir Popović declared that the Yugoslav peoples never had committed nor ever would commit an act of aggression, but that neither would they tolerate any such action. He also called attention to the unjust attitude of influential Italian circles towards Balkan cooperation, expressing the desire and hope that Italy would eventually set out on the road to cooperation, on the basis of equal rights. At the end of his statement Vladimir Popović welcomed the readiness of the Federal Executive Council to offer more active support to the efforts of the European countries for the consolidation and promotion of their security.

Towards the end of the discussion Petar Stambolić proposed a resolution on behalf of a group of deputies, to be submitted to the Federal People's Assembly. In the resolution, which was unanimously adopted, the Committee stated its full approval of all the views expressed at the talks held with the Turkish representatives during President Tito's visit. Stating its satisfaction with the decisions reached at the Ankara talks regarding the further joint efforts for the development of Tripartite cooperation in all fields, the Committee agreed to begin seeking the most convenient forms for the conversion of the Tripartite Agreement into a formal alliance. The Foreign Affairs Committee expressed its agreement with the decision to extend more active support to the efforts of the European countries to strengthen their security, the Committee being convinced that this represented the best way to ease international tension and insure international cooperation.

DR JOVAN ĐORĐEVIĆ

## The University Bill

It is two years since the discussion on the new federal Law on Universities was initiated. Basic decrees, set forth immediately after the liberation, and traditions which are similar to those University traditions prevailing in Europe—especially in Central Europe, formed the basis of the work of the Universities and their Faculties. The Status of the Universities in pre-war Yugoslavia was not a uniform one and that is why both the organization and the curriculum of individual Universities greatly differed. The present practice regarding all Yugoslav Universities is that they should be organized along the same principles and pursue the same system of studies. This common attitude towards the basic problems of University organization and University studies is the result of much closer collaboration among the Universities in present-day Yugoslavia, and especially in the uniform social and political structure which is the product of the new Socialist State community.

However, a new University Law is needed if the legal foundations of a much stronger unity in the field of University organization and University studies is to be achieved. This need became an urgent one when, in the development of socialist Democracy, new principles came to the fore, shedding a new light on the problem of the structure of the Universities and on that of the management of the Universities and their Departments. A progressive Socialist society requires a higher level of scientific, professorial and expert work; it is in need of able and independent workers in the fields of science and culture; it needs highly qualified experts (doctors, civil engineers, lawyers, economists, teachers, veterinary surgeons etc). The breaking up of all sorts of monopolies and the encouragement of freedom of thought and of scientific work are essential conditions for the existence and progress of the Socialist society.

In accordance with this, the position of scientific, edu-

cational, cultural and other similar institutions is being necessarily changed. They are becoming independent of State authority; they are ceasing to be *institutions of the traditional Administrative Law*.

Taking these demands of the social, political and cultural development for granted, the Federal Constitutional Law of January 13, 1953, in Art. 4 Point 2 provides as follows: „The self-government of the people is guaranteed in the spheres of public enlightenment, culture and social services“. This principle led to lively and comprehensive discussion on the University Bill. It also helped to reconcile some opposing views as to how certain problems of the management of the Universities are to be solved. Thanks to this it was possible to find a basis for the solution and to proceed to a speedy preparation of the Bill, which would enjoy the support of University circles, of students and of other factors concerned. The great majority of University professors and other members of the University staff gave their support to the Bill when its fourth version was published by the Public Education Committee of the Federal People's Assembly. More than 6,000 proposals were received by this Committee, which discussed them, and submitted the Draft to the Legal Committee, in accordance with Parliamentary procedure. It is expected that the Assembly, at its coming session, will put the Bill on its agenda, and pass it.

The Draft will lead to the enactment of the so-called general Law. This means that the University Law will provide the basic and uniform principles which the Republican University Laws will expound and supplement with their own provisions. In addition to this, the University as a whole and each Faculty separately, will ordain their statutes. The University statutes will deal with organization, with the University organs, with its institutions and with its administration. The statutes of the Faculties will like-



wise deal with organization, with work, with their organs and with the studies at the Faculty. Faculty institutions and administration will also be the subject of these regulations. The statutes are not, strictly speaking, autonomous acts, but they are nevertheless an important factor of the University. These statutes are the work of the Universities and Faculties and will be subject to the People's Assemblies of the Republics for approval, though this act of approval will not alter the character of these statutes. The University and Faculties will, however, adhere to the basic principles and the fundamental regulations of the Law.

However, although concerning principles only, the Draft of the University Law ordains many changes dealing with the situation, organization and work of the University, ensuring the advancement of the University as the most prominent scientific and teaching centre.

The structure of the University deserves special attention. According to this Draft, the University is neither a confederation of Faculties nor a corporation comprising Faculties as more or less independent bodies. The idea of the Draft is to treat the University as a community of Faculties which are the leading scientific institutions for a certain group of sciences. The duty of the University is to coordinate and improve scientific and teaching work and to solve other problems in which all Faculties and other University institutions are interested. The University is, therefore, a union of autonomous Faculties. Such concepts of the University are the result of the general growth of science and of an improved division of labour in the field of training highly specialized experts. Under these conditions, the University, if organized in accordance with administrative centralism, would obstruct the development of particular scientific branches and that of teaching at the Faculties, hampering the solution of scientific and teaching problems in places where creative work is being carried out i. e., at the Faculties and their institutions.

The present tasks of the Faculties, and those of the Universities are complex and manifold, so that it is impossible to enclose them in a single legal formula. The Draft indicates the following tasks: (a) to educate highly specialized experts through lectures and through the teaching of theory and practice; (b) to acquaint students with methods of scientific work; to organize scientific work and to train the younger generations of scientific workers; to improve the knowledge of already existing experts; (c) to help the students to become good citizens of the Socialist community; (d) to co-operate with economic, cultural and other social institutions and organizations in Yugoslavia and to come into touch with foreign scientific institutions. The general aim of this activity is to bring science and teaching to a higher level, thus helping the economic, cultural and social progress of the country. *Teaching and scientific work* are, therefore, the basic functions of the University. The Draft also stresses the educational and social function of the University, in view of the fact that the scientific thought, technique and the free, able and conscious members of intelligentsia and experts may play, and in fact are bound to play, an important role in a society which, to quote the words of the famous American, judge Holmes, takes for the basis of its work and of its development „not Spencer's social statics" but „social dynamics".

The Draft adheres to the principle of the freedom of teaching and scientific work at the University providing for equal rights of all citizens to study at the University. It is doing its best to conduct its teaching in accordance with modern scientific and pedagogic principles, to improve it and to stimulate active and creative scientific work at the Faculties, Universities and scientific institutions. In accordance with this, a rule has been laid down to teach according to planned methods. Statutes will provide for the study of those subjects which are obligatory. Each subject will be taught in accordance with a special program. Teaching plans and programs will be published. Faculties are under the obligation to organize special courses (which are as a rule, post-graduate studies) in addition to the general undergraduate courses. A special course of study for the degree of doctor will also be organized. The degree of doctor will be conferred on the candidate after he or she passes an oral examination and after the successful defence of a scientific thesis (dissertation).

The regulations dealing with the members of the University staff and other scientific workers are characteristic. The members of the staff are lecturers, junior and senior professors. Other scientific workers are assistants, tutors, teachers and expert and scientific members of various University institutions. Only those candidates who are

Doctors of Arts or Doctors of Science, or who have habilitated (their work must be an original scientific work or a study of scientific value) are eligible as members of University staff. University teachers must be able lecturers, they must command an undisputed knowledge of their subject and be able to conduct scientific work independently. A lecturer cannot be promoted to the post of a junior professor, neither can he become a senior one, unless he has produced new scientific works since he was elected to his previous University post. In order to develop competition among the candidates, irrespective of the fact whether they are at the University or not, the Draft introduces the principle of reelection of assistants and University Professors after a period of five years.

To a greater degree than previous regulations, this Draft favours the establishment of institutes, laboratories and of other teaching and scientific institutions. It provides certain scientific workers to be exclusively engaged in research work. In such a way they will improve the standard of teaching and bring scientific work to a higher level. The University has, of course, no monopoly of scientific work, and all the scientific institutions are not within the framework of the University. However, those Universities which do not possess all research institutes are neither in a position to achieve results expected from a modern University, nor to satisfy requirements foreseen in the present Draft. The Draft accordingly, provides that a new category of scientific workers may be introduced into the University — a category of scientific workers who will be only partially, or not at all, engaged in teaching. The Draft provides that some University scientific institutions will become independent — the competence of the Faculties will be thus greatly broadened compared with that which corresponded to the traditional concepts of Faculties as purely teaching institutions.

As already shown, the tendency of the Draft is to bring the teaching, the training of experts and the scientific work at the Universities to a higher level. This is one of the basic features of the new University Bill. New efforts and new activity on the part of the professors and other members of the Faculties, greater subsidies for teaching and scientific work, and the general help of the community — all these are required if the Universities are to find their proper place within the social organization, if they are to fulfil the hopes placed in them by the youth, and if they are to aid social, political and cultural development.

The principle of the social management of the Universities is the basic principle underlying the new Bill. It will be, moreover, the first Law in which the principle of social management is treated in a comprehensive and detailed way. In view of the fact that this is an innovation in the field of management of social institutions, these concepts of social management have as yet been inadequately treated theoretically, and have not only provoked lively discussions but led to conflicting views. The general theory of social management is that it should start from the following two assumptions: a) the autonomy of the institutions and b) that the men and women working in these institutions as well as citizens from without who are entitled by their experience, knowledge and moral integrity to take part in the management of these institutions shall do so. The positive forms of social management of the institutions which are performing some public functions, i. e., institutions which do not originate but only apply certain regulations, or perform technical and administrative tasks — such as, for instance, social insurance institutions — are socially managed by those people elected by the insured, who are directly interested in the performance of the duty of these institutions. The experts and administrative personnel, in this case, are not an essential element of social management. In the institutions in the fields of public education, science and culture, on the other hand, where the people working there are initiators and the most active elements, social management inevitably rests on the activity and participation of such elements.

Which part in the social management of such institutions is to be played by workers and citizens outside these institutions — this question was discussed in detail when the problem of social management of schools in general was studied. The same thing happened when the University Bill was being prepared. Two extreme points of view resulted in a severe clash of opinion. These conflicting views contributed, however, to clearer thinking and are bound to produce similar results when the Drafts concerning elementary and secondary schools, scientific institutes, theatres and other educational, scientific, cultural and artistic institutions come under discussion.



The first of these two views is held by those working in the institutions — their basic idea is that *self-government* should be the basis of social management. They are of the opinion that the staffs of the Universities and Faculties, helped by some scientists outside of the Universities, should control this centres of science and teaching. The second group consider that social management and external management are one and the same thing, i. e., they wish to hand over the control of these institutions, essentially although not exclusively, to citizens who are not engaged in the work of these institutions. According to the first view, self-government is the highest form of control of the Universities; the second view is affected by the external aspect of social management, and underestimates the management role played by those working in the institutions. Although extreme versions of these two opinions are given here, it is evident that both of them deprive the system of social management of its most constructive elements and of its inherent dynamism. At the same time, it is certain that the first view amounts to a slight modification of self-government in favour of social management, while the second opinion either completely denies the importance of the part played by those who are working in these institutions or considers social management to be in opposition to self-government from within. Such a view has found expression in the conservative standpoint, according to which social management is, essentially, nothing but *one form of self-government*.

The University Bill treats social management as a homogeneous and uniform system in which elements both of working collectives and representatives of the scientific and expert public outside of the University are duly represented. These are essential conditions which, if fulfilled, make social management the new principle of social organization, superseding the two known principles in the field of organization and of the management of the Universities. The first of these two principles is that of self-government, according to which the Universities are a section of the State organization, a field of State Administrative Law with its limited autonomy, the representatives of which are the teaching collective. This principle is prevalent in Europe. The second principle prevails in the USA. This is the principle of so-called outside control. It means that the University, not only as a business but also as a teaching and scientific institution, is controlled by people outside it. These people assume the role of some kind of trustees, supervisors and employers.

Social management, instituted by the University Law, combining the participation of the teaching and scientific collectives with the scientific, expert and public workers outside the University, is a unique system, in which the representatives of the teachers, both when they take part with citizens in governing bodies outside of the University, and when they themselves form a governing body — as representatives of social management. Such a conception is not only ideologically correct but is a practical necessity. Hierarchy in the Universities would hamper the successful work of these institutions. It would result in conflicts, inequality and in the disputes as regards the right of dealing with legal matters. It would, also, result in subjugation, i. e., in the passivity of certain elements of social management. Finally, the view cannot be held that teachers and other expert and scientific workers at the Universities are not entitled and qualified to undertake certain acts of management. They should not and must not enjoy either a supremacy or a position of monopoly in the management of the Universities. But they should not be deprived of the right to be active elements in the application of the principle of social management in the Faculties and Universities.

In accordance with these concepts, a special mechanism of University and Faculty management has been set up. The University Council, the University Administration and the Rector form the administrative bodies of the Universities. The Council of the Faculty, its Administration and the Dean form the administrative bodies of the Faculties. The structure of the University and Faculty Councils is quite new. The University Council consists of mem-

bers elected by the Assemblies of the Republics from the rank of scientific, expert and other public workers, of one representative of the students, of one member of the City Council. The Rector and pro-rector are also members of the University Council. In addition to the members elected by the Assemblies of the Republics, the Faculty Council is made up of teachers elected by the Faculty Administration. The Dean and one representative of the students are also members of this Council. All these members enjoy equal rights, with one exception, i. e., the representative of the students has no voting rights when teachers are elected, and when the curriculum is being decided on.

The competence of these bodies is, as a rule, as follows: they decide on the organization and curriculum; they estimate financial resources and control expenditures; they choose and promote teachers (University Council must approve the choice).

The competence of these bodies and that of the University or Faculty Administration is delimited by an important principle proclaimed by the Draft. It reads as follows: „The teaching and scientific collective are solely responsible for teaching and scientific work“. The University and Faculty Administrations are composed of representatives i. e., of members, of these collectives. The Rector, pro-rector and deans of all the Faculties are members of the University Administration. All teachers, a certain number of assistant lecturers and other members of the Faculties are members of Faculty Administration. The University Administration, owing to the relatively small University administrative competence, is mainly engaged in problems of administrative interest concerning the University as a whole, but does not interfere in the administration of Faculties.

All problems of teaching, organization and administration of scientific institutions and of scientific work, as well as other problems of fundamental importance to successful teaching and to scientific work fall within the competence of the Faculty Administration. Among other things, it elects teachers, proposes the statute for approval, draws up the Faculty budget, fixes the curriculum, trains the younger generation of scientific workers and performs similar tasks. The Rector is the representative of the University, and the Dean of the Faculty. They are the supreme executive and administrative organs. In addition to this, the Rector presides over the University Administration and Dean over that of the Faculty.

It is for the Federal People's Assembly to decide whether it will give its assent to the above proposal. Practice will show whether this mechanism has any inherent weaknesses. But now some important points should be stressed.

Firstly, the mechanism of social management has been deeply studied. It is supported by the opinion and good will of both public and University circles. Secondly, social management is the inevitable result of the strengthening and development of the Socialist Democracy in Yugoslavia. Thirdly, this principle will prevent the Universities from becoming secluded bodies and will make them independent of the competence and tutorship of State administration. In addition to the rights enjoyed by the People's Assembly, only the Executive Councils of the Republics will have the right to supervise the legality of the acts of the Universities and Faculties. This is the greatest step yet recorded on the way to the emancipation of science from the sphere of administration. Fourthly, social management makes the scientific, teaching and educational functions independent of the system of State authority, transferring them to socially autonomous institutions which freely, but with a sense of social responsibility, perform functions which are important to the progress and life of the community. Social management marks, therefore, the beginning of the process of „withering away“, of merging in the society, — it marks the democratization of teaching and scientific functions. *Socialism linked with democracy demands and favours such a process.*

That is why the University Bill in Yugoslavia has an importance which goes beyond that of an ordinary University Law.



# ACTUALITIES

DORDE JERKOVIC

## AN UNSATISFACTORY BEGINNING

U P till now the talks in Geneva have not taken such a course as to encourage any conclusions concerning the prospects and outcome of the conference. They do not even encourage any conjectures or prognostications as regards the succeeding phases of the talks on individual questions. The conference is chiefly conducted behind closed doors and under the shadow of certain events which preceded it, hence the public cannot yet find those elements in the various reports from Geneva which would serve as an indispensable basis for conclusions and predictions.

The Berlin decision on the holding of the Geneva conference was interpreted as a sign that Soviet policy and European powers were ready to look for a compromise solution for the Korean and Indo-Chinese questions. Not that the USSR as such was perhaps inclined to such solutions, but primarily it wished to shift the main burden of responsibility for the failure of the Berlin talks on European questions, and because it would assume the role of the champion of peace in the eyes of the world public. If one adds to this that two great powers in Europe, each for different reasons, were interested in the final settlement of these issues, it might be said that in the period between the Berlin and Geneva Conferences there were prospects for a partial success of the Geneva talks, although doubts were still entertained as to whether there was a possibility of such a conference — predominantly a great-power conference — leading to radical and more enduring solutions of the questions touching the interests of the third, small countries.

For these reasons, and in view of the general world situation, the position of the great powers in that period was characterized by inequality, and under certain conditions justified a cautious optimism. In contrast to the position of Soviet policy which, after Berlin, appeared to be chiefly responsible for the failure of the talks, the position of the Western Powers, thanks to certain constructive moves in Berlin, especially in regard to Austria — seems to be more solid. Hence the question arises whether they will be able to consolidate their position and increase their advantage by setting up a common platform for an acceptable solution of the Korean and Indo-Chinese issues, in keeping with the UN

policy in the first mentioned case, and with the principle of the right to self-determination in the second case.

Directly before the Geneva meeting, however, matters took a somewhat different course — a course which exercised an appreciable influence on the talks. Mr. Dulles, who was not particularly enthusiastic about either the Berlin or the Geneva Conference, believing that such talks with the USSR were not the kind of intercourse which that country understands and values — on the eve of the Conference announced a proposed plan of „united action“ in Indo-China. He had visited London and Paris — rather hastily and with considerable noise, in order to ensure cooperation for this plan, whose essential purpose was either to make the Geneva Conference superfluous, or to take it in the spirit of an open and full capitulation of the other side. More moderate British policy felt impelled to withhold cooperation on the Dulles plan, owing to internal opposition and international considerations. Perhaps primarily on account of the London attitude, this plan equally failed to ensure the support of Paris, although it was otherwise quite suitable to certain Paris quarters, and was perhaps even made on their initiative. As a result, the whole matter had a rather uncomfortable ring, and provoked real confusion, in conjunction with Eisenhower's statement on a willingness to accept the modus vivendi in Indo-China, just at the time when Dulles was proposing a plan of action on extreme lines. This confusion, together with all that came after, not only created an uneasy feeling in the world on the eve of the Geneva Conference, but also revealed a serious divergence of views between the Western Powers, placing America in a certain isolation, which undoubtedly meant a weakening of the Western position generally. True, the British position was strengthened, but the other side also found itself, without any effort, in a more favourable position than it anticipated and, in general in a situation which, in the event of the complete failure of the talks, could not bring upon it the full responsibility for such an outcome.

With such relations existing between the principal Western powers, American views received a certain blow from the Conference of the Five Asian Countries in Ceylon, whose conclusions were nearer to the proposal of the Asian speakers in Geneva than to those made by the West, especially in the American version, although neither the motives of Asian countries nor their general policy would be di-

rected against Western initiatives if it was presented unitedly and constructively. The crisis of the French Government which, like before, during the meeting in Bermuda, and subsequently during the talks in Berlin, was postponed solely in view of the country's need for a Government at such a critical moment — did not exactly contribute to the strengthening of the position of Western policy in Geneva, though it undoubtedly encouraged the other side.

Although all this should not be taken as the only explanation of the course of the Geneva talks as conducted hitherto, there is no doubt that matters would have been somewhat different were it not for all these facts. It seems that Western policy missed a rare opportunity to appear in Geneva with the advantages gained in Berlin which, combined with reasonable proposals on Korea and Indo-China, might have made a success of Geneva, thus constituting an affirmation of non-Soviet policy in the world. Now, however, the only course left is to redouble the efforts to strengthen the shaken unity and try, by some constructive solution, to win back the lost positions in order to avoid a failure of the talks, which would constitute a blow to non-Soviet policy — a very desirable epilogue from the viewpoint of the intentions and interests of the USSR.

## END OF THE ARMAMENT RACE?

AFTER a brief and unsuccessful session in New York, the Subcommittee of the UN Disarmament Commission resumed its work in London on May 13. The work of the Commission was initiated by the Four-Power Berlin decision, taken on the basis of the resolution of the General Assembly of November 1953, in which the Assembly called upon the Commission to resume its activity, at the same time instructing it as to the manner and method of work, so that this important problem might emerge out of the deadlock in which it has been for years.

Since its inception — immediately after the war — the Disarmament Commission has not been able to make a single step because of the diametrically opposite views of the Soviet Union and other countries on the question of disarmament. As a matter of fact — and this was inevitable in the cold war period — instead of progress in



disarmament, the world saw an armament race. In these circumstances, the Soviet Union had considerable advantages over the Western powers, as it could turn all discussion on disarmament into cheap and cynical propaganda, while the other side found it an unsuitable theme for the time being, as it was in a subordinate position on this issue — lagging far behind Soviet achievements.

It was necessary to establish a certain balance of relations in this sphere, in order that the talks on the question of disarmament might open the prospect of such developments as would be in keeping with the need for the easing of tension in the world.

The above-mentioned UNO resolution, as well as the Four Power decision and the current activity of the Sub-Committee for Disarmament, which included the representatives of Canada, Great Britain, France, China, the USA and USSR, came at a time when this balance was being established, and when the peace-loving nations were increasingly urging for the removal of the tension which had existed for years.

It would be too rash to try to predict the possible outcome of the current talks in London, in view of the huge obstacles which are being put in the way of the settlement of this problem by the policy of individual great powers, and also because of the existence of a series of less familiar but definite factors which may influence the course and results of the discussions.

During the previous brief activity of the Sub-Commission in New York, the Soviet delegation succeeded in complicating and seriously obstructing every important move by making definite proposals which, under the present conditions and relations in the world, could not but be interpreted as tending to undermine the work of the Sub-Commission. The Soviet delegation, for instance, persisted in its view that instead of the Formosa Government representative, the Sub-Commission should invite the representative of the People's Republic of China, and that it should also be widened to include two new members — India and Czechoslovakia, who are not members of the Commission, although the latter had proposed, in keeping with the recommendations of the General Assembly, that talks be conducted by a limited number of the principal responsible powers in the world — in the form of the Sub-Commission — to ensure more efficacious work being done.

Of course, if the problem of the representation of PR China in UNO is taken as a matter of principle, then it calls for earnest and appropriate decision. This is all the more necessary if a genuine and realistic agreement is desired in the field of disarmament, and this agreement could hardly be imagined without such a country as China. But it is another question how far it is reasonable and justified, politically and formally, to insist on placing the matter before such a UN organ as this Sub-Commission, whose mandate is strictly limited, while its composition may be altered only by decision of the body which is competent to admit new members, and the can-

cellation or confirmation of the credentials of individual delegations. It seems that this is a question of a mere manoeuvre — a manoeuvre calculated to create a definite effect in the eyes of PR China, and at the same time to hamper the work of the Sub-Commission, all of which is in keeping with the efforts of the USSR to play once again the role of China's protagonist and champion of peace, — though the method of procedure actually reveals quite different objectives.

Nor can the proposal for the admission of India and Czechoslovakia as members of the Sub-Commission be interpreted in any other way. The composition of the Sub-Commission is qualified by the fact it is limited to twelve members, and its membership corresponds to the composition of the Security Council, to which Canada has been added, in view of her specific position in atomic armament. Hence neither the narrower nor the wider body is competent to alter, widen or reduce the composition as regards number. If there had been a wish to make any changes in this respect, the only suitable opportunity presented itself at last year's General Assembly. At that Session, however, the USSR, neither supported the above mentioned resolution, nor mentioned the present proposals. Therefore although India's cooperation in UNO and outside that organization in favour of peace and international cooperation is unquestioned — the present move of Soviet policy cannot but be interpreted as an attempt to exploit the reputation of India as well as an attempt to provoke mistrust and discord between her and the Western powers, again in keeping with the unconstructive aims of Soviet policy.

The projects of the Western powers in this sphere have not always been such as to warrant their acceptance and support without reservations. Very frequently they presented themselves to the peace-loving nations as a lesser evil, in comparison with the unacceptable Soviet offers, and hence they were passed and adopted. It is to be desired — and conditions for this actually exist — that the Western powers, in keeping with the wishes of the nations and the need for peace in the world, should propose more acceptable plans and solutions. At this moment, the main difficulties are being created by the Soviet policy, and that side will be chiefly responsible if it insists on its claims and conditions as heretofore, but the position will be equally unsatisfactory if the other side tackles this delicate problem by putting forward proposals which are neither particularly acceptable nor constructive.

The Sub-Committee has begun work in London under the vigilant eye of the world public. It is aware that finally, but not later than the beginning of next winter, it will have to submit a report to the General Assembly, containing an account of its efforts and omissions. This, however, is a guarantee that the present efforts will produce some results. If nothing else, they will at least shed definite light on the attitudes and views of all the parties at the present moment, and thus enable the General Assembly to

take such steps as are indispensable for approaching a decision in a matter on which the peace in the world seems to be increasingly dependent.

## SOLVING A RIDDLE

THE agreements reached between India and the People's Republic of China on April 29 with regard to various problems concerning the relations of the two countries in Tibet, are interesting from two points: firstly, with regard to the conditions under which they took place, and secondly, from the point of view of their essence and the principles upon which they are based.

A certain disagreement arose between the two countries at the end of 1950, when the Central Government of P.R. China started assuming control in Tibet, and sending officials and armed units there. India immediately became anxious about her profitable trade with Tibet, from whence she derived large quantities of wool for her textile industry. In the desire to seize any advantageous trade opportunities of there, India asked for the privilege which the British had acquired, such as trading missions with a semi-diplomatic status, broadcasting stations, armed units in the main trading centres — but without reciprocity.

India's first reaction to China's interference in Tibet was to safeguard the internal autonomy of the latter and, probably, to prolong her own privilege. Instead of a solution, a standstill ensued, which lasted nearly three years, but at the end of 1953 talks were resumed in Peking, and finally agreement was reached by the end of April last.

The talks were carried out in a spirit of „mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual consent not to interfere in internal affairs, the recognition of equal rights, a desire for mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence“ — meaning India's acknowledgment of the principles which should be the base of good neighbourly relations.

An agreement has been reached on trade and traffic between India and the Chinese region of Tibet, for the purpose of developing trade and facilitating pilgrimage and traveling in both directions. Notes have been exchanged between the representatives of both countries, stating that the Indian Government is prepared to withdraw military escorts from Tibet, and hand over to the Chinese Government all stations and the postal, telegraphic and telephone services, together with



their installations. Further, accommodation for merchants and commercial representatives on both sides, questions of pilgrimage, etc. are to be arranged by mutual consent.

According to earlier information, the Indian Government has been allowed to open a general consulate in the capital of Tibet, Lhasa, to replace the former institutions of colonial character. This has placed the relations of the two countries on a modern legal basis, as between two sovereign states.

It has been mentioned earlier that these agreements also deserve special attention in view of the situation in Asia and in the world in general at the time of their materialization.

The agreements were concluded at the moment when India and independent Asia faced the need to take steps towards the easing and solution of the Indochina problem, conformable to the anti-colonial aspirations of the Asiatic peoples. This was also at the moment when Asia was threatened by further complications in Indochina in connection with Dulles' measures on the eve of Geneva conference, which might

have prolonged the war indefinitely. But thanks to a certain resistance in Europe, and in independent Asia, especially, nothing has happened so far; but if the Geneva conference fails, it is very likely that such endeavour will be repeated, perhaps even more resolutely. In any case it is already known that the West intends to institute an organization in the lines of the Atlantic Treaty in south-east Asia, regardless of the wishes of either the majority or the minority of the Asian states.

This proposal which according to the statement of its initiator, is intended to suppress and ward off aggressive expansion in this part of the world, has been censured in Asia as a danger to peace, containing elements of the feudal-colonial past, and as such jeopardizing the newly acquired independence of the national states in Asia. As a reply to this proposal, and with the intention of preventing in time any possible danger — and in an endeavour to restore peace in Indochina, a conference was called at Ceylon, where the chiefs of five independent states of Asia despite their differences,

were almost unanimous as to the major points at issue in that region.

If considered in this light, the Indo-Chinese agreement may be taken as a positive sign of consolidation of relations in this sensitive spot, especially if P. R. China is willing in her relations with neighbouring countries, to acknowledge and respect all the principles on which her talks and agreement with influential India were based. But if this is not the case, and if China makes distinctions between powerful and influential neighbours and weaker ones, this agreement, while serving the ends of security on the more important side, would leave her free to act unhindered in other directions. This at all events will be clarified at the Geneva conference, where China's attitude towards the Indochina problems, and also towards Burma, with which she has some delicate variances, will be defined. There are many facts indicating that a policy of peace and good neighbourly relations is vital to backward and devastated China. But the future will show how matters work out.

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# OPINIONS ON ACTUAL PROBLEMS

RADE VLKOV

## Praiseworthy Initiative

### REGARDING THE PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION OF A BALKAN ASSEMBLY

THE hitherto more than successful development of tripartite cooperation in the Balkans has revealed that the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia is based on a broad foundation of joint interests and aspirations, having affirmed itself in a short time as a fruitful instrument of international significance, and as a solid basis for an increasingly complete and lasting process of rapprochement, this being the feature which distinguishes it from similar arrangements in the past. I think I can best express the feelings and conviction of the Yugoslav public by stating that the prospects for the strengthening of cooperation between the three peoples, and their manifold ties in all fields, are so certain today that no one can speak of them as prospects any longer. The manifestations of friendship, and the well-known decisions reached during the recent visit of Marshal Tito to Turkey, constitute an extremely impressive proof that such feelings are shared by the Turkish people and their statesmen. We are more than convinced that such aspirations and decisions will receive an enthusiastic confirmation by the Greek people and their representatives during the forthcoming visit of the Yugoslav President to Greece.

A characteristic and important feature of these joint efforts to devise the best possible ways of establishing still closer ties is that the idea of fostering these links does not derive from official diplomatic circles only, for it is very frequently due to the initiative of the most varied social and cultural organisations and the public itself. In this respect the proposal made by the Athens review „European Life“, and coming from the pen of Mr. Leon Makas, is extremely interesting.

The review „European Life“, advanced a proposal for the creation of a Balkan Assembly for public discussion and consideration. The proposal is inspired by the wish to promote cooperation among the countries of the Balkan Agreement and not to limit it to the field of policy, diplomacy and defence, but to extend it to other spheres, thus creating a broad community which would encompass trade, cultural and social exchange on a large scale. It is worth while reviewing the main features of this proposal, in view of its general conception and the elements it contains.

The author of the article, Mr. Makas, envisages the Balkan advisory assembly as a joint institution which would contribute to the achievement of Balkan unity on a broad basis. Each of the three countries would be represented in the Assembly by an equal number of 15 to 20 deputies, who would be appointed by the national parliaments. The Assembly would draw up its own working schedule, determine its permanent seat, elect its presidium and commissions, and draw up the agenda for regular or special sessions. The ministers of the three governments would also be able to attend the session of the Assembly, but without the power to vote on matters referring directly to their office, so that they would have only an advisory function. The proposals which would be debated by the Balkan Assembly and included in the working schedule, in accordance with the agenda adopted, would deal with the promotion of various forms of cooperation between the participating countries. These would be the general lines along which, in the

opinion of the review, it would be opportune to make a draft project defining the competence and functions of the Assembly.

The second interesting feature of this proposal consists in the fact that it does not limit participation in the work of the Balkan Assembly only to Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, but foresees that the door should be left open for the admission of the other Balkan and neighbouring countries. In the opinion of the authors, Austria, through her observers could take part in the work of the Assembly, from the very beginning, until she has achieved sovereignty and independence.

Our public received Mr. Makas's idea with interest, as a constructive initiative which deserves to be studied in all its aspects. The conception itself manifests the fact that tripartite cooperation based on the Ankara Agreement has been understood and welcomed by the Greek people as a foundation for ever broader association, as a historical process which is not limited in scope or duration. Particular stress is laid on the spirit by which the proposal is inspired, i. e., the aspiration to convert Balkan cooperation — in the words of the review — into a „real working site of unselfish efforts towards the strengthening of ties, into a basis of peace for all of Europe and the world, and a centre of attraction for the subjugated peoples of our peninsula.“

The initiative of the Greek review, which was warmly received and commented upon in our country, as an expression of the people's desire to expand and invest tripartite cooperation with new forms, will doubtless also be received with the same attention in the third allied country — Turkey. Notable progress has been achieved so far in the rapprochement of the three countries in the most vital fields owing to the identical aspirations of the peoples for the establishment of still closer ties and common efforts, with the purpose of insuring independence, peace, and progress in this part of the world. This is a decisive factor which encourages and creates lasting ties. Therefore every initiative which has its motives in the desire to contribute to the consolidation of cooperation, unity and security of the Balkans deserves to be extensively examined in a spirit of sincerity and understanding, which is characteristic of the joint efforts for the achievement of this objective.

Needless to say it would not be possible, for the time being, to embark on a detailed analysis of all the elements contained in the proposal of the review „European Life“ and their practical feasibility. This is a matter which requires previous consideration in all three countries, that is to say, by all three parliaments. But the first comments evoked by the idea indicate that it is a timely one, and that it is worthy of attention.

This proposal is yet another indication of the wealth of prospects offered by tripartite cooperation, and not only to the peoples of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia, and it shows that the manifold benefits from the policy of tripartite cooperation which has led us to the threshold of an alliance are not limited only to the narrow sphere of relations between the three countries, but are already felt by all the peoples of the Balkans and Europe who aspire to peace and progress under conditions of independence and equal rights.



## Regulation of Relations Between Yugoslavia and Austria

THE gradual normalisation of Austro-Yugoslav relations and the elimination of the irregularities caused by the war is an extremely long and complex process. Nevertheless, constant progress is being made, thus making possible transition from the phase of unsolved problems to a new period of active cooperation.

The putting into practice of solutions of various problems which were provided for during the visit of the Yugoslav Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Koča Popović, to Dr. Karl Gruber the former Austrian Foreign Minister last November, was begun on January 1, 1954.

The definite removal of the Drava river problem from the agenda was undoubtedly one of the most important questions to be solved. After two years of negotiations in Bled, Vrbovsko Jezero and Opatija, a series of enactments on the Drava river electric power system was signed on April 14, 1954. This settlement consists of three enactments. One provides for a credit of over 50 million shillings from Austria for the purchase of material and equipment for the purpose of expanding the Yugoslav power system, with the proviso that part of the credit be simply written off after the fulfilment of the Yugoslav grants, while the other, larger part would be paid off by Yugoslav power supplies. Thus a convenient solution has been devised enabling Austria to compensate for the loss she caused Yugoslavia by hampering the work of the Yugoslav power stations on the Drava. For her part Austria has indicated her willingness to aid the expansion of these Yugoslav plants, helping to increase their output, and she will use part of the power thus generated, which she will receive as repayment of her loan. Although this is a purely compensatory settlement between the two countries, some objections have nevertheless been voiced on the Yugoslav side, to the effect that electric power requirements are very large in Yugoslavia, and that our country has perhaps made a sacrifice by depriving herself of a part of her electric power in giving it up to Austria. These objections can be overcome very easily however. The power which Yugoslavia will supply to Austria is a surplus of electric power in her system of production, produced exactly by the investments loan that enabled Yugoslavia to develop her power economy.

The most important fact as far as we are concerned is that a water power timetable in the Drava plants has been definitely drawn up. The speed and quantities of water which Austria must release when opening the dams of her power plants have been exactly established, so that a regular water supply enabling the smooth functioning of the Yugoslav plants is insured.

Another sound tendency was revealed on this occasion i. e. the avoidance of red tape and the by-passing of complicated diplomatic channels. Instead of resolving the Drava problem through diplomatic channels a special expert commission for the Drava river regime was formed, and its statute finally adopted in Graz. This expert commission will meet from time to time, and is competent to deal with all controversial issues that may arise over the Drava river regime, thus facilitating matters both for diplomatic and expert circles, as it will be far easier for the experts in the commission to devise a solution, than would be the case if these disputes were transferred into the diplomatic field.

It is also expected that the question of social insurance will be settled between Yugoslavia and Austria. The conference on social insurance has been set for May 15, 1954, in Belgrade.

Another Austro-Yugoslav conference is scheduled to begin in Belgrade on May 18. Experts of the Austrian and Yugoslav Patent Offices will meet to regulate the question of industrial property in relation between the two countries and their citizens. As is known, Austrian civilian and industrial property was expropriated without compensation, in accordance with the decision of the Antifascist Council of People's Liberation (AVNOJ) in 1944, Austrians being considered German subjects. Now however Yugoslav

via is willing to restore the use of factory and trade marks to Austria, so that there only remains to be regulated the conditions under which the Austrians will enjoy these rights in the future. The Austrians do not conceal the fact that they expect much from the conference, as they believe that Austrian goods have already established their reputation in Yugoslavia, and that their trade marks have not been forgotten by Yugoslav consumers, so that Austrian goods will again be purchased and sold in Yugoslav shops.

A railway conference was likewise held in Jesenice a few days ago, at which problems of postal traffic between the two countries were discussed. The volume of postal traffic is steadily increasing, thus rendering the handling of mail at the frontier station extremely difficult. Therefore both sides agreed that the transfer of the mail should be effected in the train while in transit on the Ljubljana-Beljak route. In this way the Yugoslav postmen will hand over the mail to their Austrian colleagues on their territory, and vice versa, and not at the frontier station. This will be a valuable timesaver, as far less time would be lost in the handling of the mail and the customs operations at the frontier station.

Apart from this, another Austro-Yugoslav postal conference is impending, this time on the reduction of postage tariffs between Yugoslavia and Austria. It is necessary to lower the present postage rates to approximately half of the present international tariffs. The Austrians have openly stated that they need such a measure in order to maintain and develop business contacts by the rapid and convenient means of postal correspondence, small packages and particularly trade samples. Yugoslavia is also willing to reach an agreement.

The necessity of convoking an economic conference between Yugoslavia and Austria on a broader basis, at which many questions regarding trade exchange, between the two countries would be discussed, was confirmed during the latest visit of the Counsellor of State, Mr Pavlič, to Vienna. Both Governments approved this suggestion, so that the conference will probably be convened shortly. It has been pointed out both on the Yugoslav and the Austrian side that this conference would be of great value in view of the fact that there are far greater possibilities of trade exchange between Yugoslavia and Austria than those exploited so far. The very structure of Austrian exports, dictated by the foreign aid received does not correspond to the economic possibilities which really exist between Yugoslavia and Austria, so that it is more than likely that Austria will soon offer broader prospects for trade exchange than is the case today.

The two countries are steadily drawing closer in the economic field. This tendency is constantly developing, but it is still far from its culmination.

It would be entirely false, however, to assume that Yugoslav-Austrian relations are cordial only in the economic field. In the political sphere cooperation between Yugoslavia and Austria is manifest in reciprocal attitude of the two countries towards their most vital problems. It should be stressed in this connexion that, by her modest participation in the settlement of the Trieste problem, Austria demonstrated the correctness of the Yugoslav view regarding the interest of the hinterland in the port of Trieste, while Yugoslavia frequently expressed her anxiety and misgivings, in view of the fact that Austria is still an occupied country. Thus the two countries are extending political support to each other within the limits of their possibilities. All this indicates that good neighbourly relations prevail between Yugoslavia and Austria, and that these relations can be advanced still further, regardless of the difference in their internal social systems.



## Practice of European Cooperation

THE period of active cold war, which lasted with varying intensity from the beginning of 1948 to the death of Stalin was, at the beginning of 1953, marked by the organisation of international alliances and other communities, and the grouping and re-grouping of those European countries which were not encompassed by the Soviet system of foreign policy. These allied and co-operative formations differ both in structure and importance. Some of them soon lost all practical value and were incorporated into other broader organizations. Others underwent radical changes of structure, which subsequently influenced their original character. The general impression is that the Western countries acted in haste in this matter, and that they lacked a clear perspective as to the future development of the organisations they were creating. How could it otherwise be explained that some agreements concluded for a fifty years term were integrated into other agreements and pacts, after the lapse of two years, or that some organisations were invested in practice with certain forms and scope which by far exceeded the framework of the original agreement they were based on.

Three basic factors exerted a decisive influence on the trend towards rapid international organisation in Europe.

The primary factor is, undoubtedly, the danger psychosis which was created in Western Europe by the steady deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and the Western allies, as well as the Soviet policy of cold war, which proved a vigorous incentive for greater defence efforts and increased the feeling of solidarity among the Western countries, both with regard to the threat of aggression and the danger which threatened their political and social systems. These tactics were at least partly or temporarily abandoned when they had achieved their aim, and when the contemplated objective of disrupting Western solidarity and fomenting internal resistance against the extant regimes in the West experienced total failure.

The second factor followed from the first and derives from the United Nations. The UN Charter was envisaged as the constitution of an international system after the war. Under the circumstances which prevailed in the post-war period this constitution revealed numerous shortcomings, thus resulting in a substantial decline of confidence in the efficiency of this institution and the protection it offered. The mechanism of the UN was based on the hypothesis of international solidarity which differed from the actual conditions which ensued in the post war period. Agreement among the great powers on matters of peace and security and the fundamental problems of world policy on which this mechanism was built was not achieved. It was shown that the creators of the UN Charter, contemplating matters from the wartime perspective, were prone to exaggerate and idealise allied harmony after the war. The weaknesses of this mechanism were no less obvious in the field of security and the policy of peace, which was based on accord between the five big powers.

One of the legal rather than political causes for this situation lay in the power of veto, whose use often assumed the character of sabotage, and became a means for crippling the activities of the Security Council. But in fact the use of the power of veto was a consequence of world political relations. The system and methods of Soviet policy on the one hand, and the contradictions shown by this policy towards the policy of the other allies in the last war revealed the impotence of the UN as a guarantor of security for all its members. Hence, confronted with the threat of the military and political aggression which the Western powers considered imminent, they resorted to the organisation of their security and collaboration on all fields bearing upon their territorial, and political security, but outside the UN framework.

The third factor is of an ideological and political nature. This is the idea of European unity or integration, the Union of Europe or the United States of Europe. This

is not a post-war idea, for the origin of Pan-European movements among European political circles can be traced back to the pre-war period, its exponents being various political associations and leagues, while it was propagated by political literature and similar means. The novel feature of this post-war manifestation lies in the fact that the movement for the union of Europe found support, although only ideological and intellectual so far, in individual European government circles and became one of the motives of American foreign policy in Europe. It is not necessary to stress that the process of European solidarity and integration is developing within the ideological framework of the Western social conceptions.

All three factors are invariably manifest in one form or other in all post-war agreements on international organisation, particularly those stemming from the period of cold war.

Needless to say, this by no means implies that the above-mentioned three are the only factors, nor does it minimize the important role played by the economic conditions which arose in the dislocated post-war economic systems of the Western countries, such as the vast disproportion between demand and opportunity, and inequality with the economic development and power of the USA.

The principle of European cooperation was introduced in all fields of political and social activity, i. e., in the political, military, economic, social and cultural spheres.

The first European defence organisation was concluded by the Brussels Agreement on economic, social and cultural cooperation and joint defence, of March 17, 1948, between the United Kingdom, Holland, Luxembourg, and France. This agreement is generally known under the name of Western Union.

This is a political, economic and military alliance in which mutual cooperation in the fields of defence, economy, culture and social wellbeing was broadly envisioned, for the purpose of protecting its particular interests and those of Europe in a broader sense.

The Brussels Agreement became the prototype of all subsequent organisations for European cooperation. All the subsequent international instruments on which similar organisations were founded contained elements, principles, ideas and forms of cooperation laid down either in the introductory provisions or the text of the Brussels Agreement. The Agreement was concluded for a fifty years term, but both its members and areas of cooperation were soon integrated in the broader communities which were subsequently established, i. e., NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and EDC (European Defence Community), the Coal and Steel Pool, the European Council and the OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Cooperation).

Owing to this line of development the Brussels agreement lost the significance of a specific international alliance and assumed the character of a programme which indicated the basis for most other organisations of European cooperation.

The OEEC, which was created by a convention signed in Paris on April 16, 1948, was the first organisation to be founded after Western Union. This convention was signed by the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Holland, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and Western Germany, as well as the Saar (through France) and Trieste. Canada participates as an observer, and the US through the American aid programme.

The OEEC, which comprises most members of all the European organisations, drew up a spectacularly extensive economic and financial programme, aimed at establishing a common European economy and synchronising the economic policies and foreign trade of its members. The OEEC strives to create sound economic conditions for the independent economic development of the member countries and to achieve the permanent coordination of their economies.



The OEEC further foresees the planned exploitation of economic resources, a wide exchange of goods and services, the setting up of customs unions, and free customs zones, the reduction and coordination of tariffs, a multilateral payments system etc. Many of these objectives are still unfulfilled, but organisation is extremely active.

In almost all these tasks the OEEC relied on the Marshall aid programme, which was conceived at the same time, by the American Foreign Aid Bill, of April 3, 1948. The function of these two organisations were closely related and the OEEC acted as an auxiliary organisation of the Marshall Plan in Europe. The policy plans and resources of the Marshall Plan provided the basis for the economic policy of this organisation.

In the field of foreign trade and mutual payments the OEEC set up the European Payments Union, as a special type of multilateral clearing house for export and import balances, as well as an instrument for the stimulation and guidance of foreign trade among the member countries.

In the field of joint defence from aggression, NATO was founded by an agreement signed in Washington on April 4, 1949. This Treaty included the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, Canada, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Holland, Norway, Portugal, the USA, the UK, and Turkey.

NATO is not exclusively an European organisation, but its basic objective is the defence of Europe and the strengthening of the defence power of its member countries.

On the one hand NATO is a defensive military alliance for collective defence from aggression, while on the other, its aim is the mobilisation of economic, political and military forces for this defence. The objective of its ideological and political provisions is to strengthen the ideological basis of the social system of its members, its economic aim is to build up their defence capacity, while its military objective is to organise and insure effective resistance in case of armed aggression.

In practice the NATO mechanism branched out into a complex and complicated machine whose organs, committees, commissions, groups, commands, agencies, and services multiplied and to a certain extent began sharing their competence with the national representatives of the respective services.

This practice particularly penetrated into the military and economic systems of its members. As NATO developed, the obligation for joint defence assumed the character of a universal military organisation, the drafting of joint plans, the arming and training of troops etc. Extensive work has been completed in internal organisation, construction of military bases, airfields etc. A joint high command has been established and the quotas of North Atlantic troops determined. A system of coordinated economic and financial measures has been implemented, while certain auxiliary bodies within NATO have been invested with an almost supranational competence, so that, in practice, the original character of NATO is gradually disappearing.

The establishment of the European Council almost coincided with the creation of NATO, as an expression of the military cooperation and defence links of the West European countries. The European Council was formed by a statute signed in London on May 5, 1949. The following countries joined this organisation: Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Holland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Turkey and Western Germany. The Saar territory is included, through France, as an attached member.

In objectives, competence, and structure the European Council is a specific international organisation. It is devoid of all competence in the mutual relations between its member countries, but strives to harmonise the policy of the member countries in accordance with the general ideological principles of European solidarity and integration.

Consequently its objective is the creation of a European movement. The European Council is not competent to make decisions in this field of propaganda and political activity. Its resolutions are not binding on its members, as they are devoid of legal force, and only exert political and moral influence. The European Council is actually an academic international institution for the study of the problem of European solidarity in all fields except the military, and for the drafting of suggestions and proposals regarding eventual political measures in these fields, with the aim of coordinating the national policies of the members on a Pan-European level. It is an organ of European public opinion and a factor in the shaping of this opinion. The Council also facilitates the exchange of opinion on a

high level and thus influences the policy of the member countries, although devoid of legal power.

The idea of European integration was strongest in a small group of West European countries, consisting of Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, France, Western Germany and Italy, which was named „Little Europe“. Three other organisations, including these countries and based on the supranational principle, i. e., the setting up of a joint super-authority to which they will transfer part of their sovereignty and which will function independently from the governments as a separate organ of this organisation, are either under way or currently contemplated. One of these organisations, the European Coal and Steel Pool, has already begun to operate; the second, the EDC, has reached the stage of ratification, although the results are still dubious, while the third, the European political community, whose creation is partly sponsored by the European Council, is still under consideration.

The European Coal and Steel Pool was founded by an agreement signed in Paris on April 18, 1951. The fundamental characteristic of this exclusively economic community consists in the fact that the production and sale of coal and steel of all members are exempt from their national economies, and are controlled by a separate united organisation. This is undoubtedly the embryo of a new supra-state system. It is limited to coal and steel, but its function is much broader, in view of the role and importance of these raw materials in industry and in the economic life of these countries in general, and the influence of their productive and commercial process on such problems as manpower, wages, social insurance, taxation, duties, transports, etc.

The process of integration within the framework of supranational authority was also manifest in the field of national defence, by the creation of the EDC. The EDC Treaty was signed in Paris on May 27, 1952. Whether it will come into power depends on its ratification by the parliaments of France and Italy, which is still pending.

The basis of the Treaty, which represents a complex instrument supplemented by a series of protocols and appendices is as follows: the members assume the obligation of extending full military and every other mutual assistance in case of aggression against any one of them. To achieve this, they are forming a community of supranational character, to encompass joint institutions, joint military forces and a joint budget. The community is not under the control of the national governments, and is integrated within the framework of NATO. In case of war the supreme commander of NATO is the supreme commander of EDC. The quotas of national troops to which each member is entitled are limited by treaty. The EDC supranational bodies enjoy broad powers in the military, economic and financial field, their competence being determined by the Treaty.

As to its legal aspect, EDC represents an attempt by its member countries to achieve integration in the field of military cooperation. Politically, it mainly constitutes a formula for the inclusion of Western Germany in the collective security system. The formula of collective security as implemented by NATO could be applied only with difficulty to Western Germany, as preference is given to the organisation and strengthening of the German army within its national framework, this being more or less unacceptable to the countries of Western Europe. The supra-national character of EDC deprives the German national military forces of their autonomy, and by the inclusion of EDC in NATO, Western Germany is also incorporated in this organisation. France and Italy however have still not ratified the Treaty. France because in the opinion of many Frenchmen the community does not offer sufficient guarantees against the resurgence of German militarism, while Italy in accordance with her traditional policy, makes a condition of ratification the settling of matters which have nothing whatever to do with it — in this case, the problem of Trieste.

The German factor in the problem of the Western countries, which is inherent in the origin of EDC, was not completely absent however, during the establishment of the Coal and Steel Pool. As in the former case, where the German military potential was concerned, the formula of a supranational community represented a certain guarantee of international control — in this case regarding German industrial potential.

Apart from these practical political considerations, the idea of „Little Europe“ in the forms manifested so far was conceived in EDC, which also extended its full support to this idea, as the first and immediately feasible limited form of European unity.



It is not possible to analyse the forms of European cooperation which have already been practically achieved so far in such a general article, as this would necessitate the individual analysis of the texts of the respective instruments, as well as the results yielded in practice.

It is obvious at first sight that European cooperation is divided into several organisations which, although interconnected, can only be coordinated with difficulty, owing to the various criteria and motives underlying the individual organisations. The concurrent obligations assumed by the same countries in various documents render this problem still more complicated, particularly where economic cooperation is concerned, as the latter — according to certain instruments — is based on the principle of strengthening the defence of the member countries while, according to others, it is based on the principle of broad economic development, on the level of general European economic coo-

peration. These two contradictory economic policies also left their imprint in the individual economic fields.

A deeper study of the relations, functions and results of the individual difficulties and contradictions in the practice of European cooperation might lead to the conclusion that there are many weaknesses in the extant organisations. Such shortcomings were already indicated by the difficulties encountered in some of these organisations. They are, moreover, quite natural in the practice of creating more or less ad hoc organisations — without deeper study of future prospects — merely dictated by the new requirements in a specific period of international relations.

This would all speak in favour of a more appropriate system, based on deeper study and broader conceptions, which would lead to the revision of certain of the existing organisations.

MIRKO ČUKOVIĆ

## Clergymen Serving Church and Country

### ACTIVITIES AND TASKS OF THE PROFESSIONAL SOCIETIES OF CATHOLIC PRIESTS IN YUGOSLAVIA

YUGOSLAVIA is one of the countries in which the Church has been separated from the state, and all recognized religious denominations placed on an equal footing. The Yugoslav Constitution guarantees, as a civil right, the freedom of conscience and religion, as well as the independent development of all religious communities. These liberal principles, differing in no way from the conceptions of any other secularized state, are to be found in a law which determines the legal position of religious communities. All faiths enjoy equal rights in Yugoslavia, but they have no state functions. Religious activities, rites and tuition are carried out freely, and any act aimed at obstructing or preventing religious gatherings and other manifestations is an offence punishable by law.

Complete freedom is also guaranteed for religious associations, clerical societies, religious papers, publications and the like. The state, furthermore, gives considerable assistance to the religious communities. With these principles, the Yugoslav law on religious communities, if compared with laws determining the position of churches in other countries, is one of the most progressive legislative acts of this kind in the world.

#### THE VATICAN AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF THE CLERGY

Despite the fact that the position of the Church in Yugoslavia has been regulated in accordance with such principles, the Vatican and its many agencies in the world do not cease their hostile propaganda against Yugoslavia. They maintain that the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia is being persecuted and subjected to the capriciousness of the state organs. What is more, the Vatican and the higher Church authorities, which are working under close supervision of the Holy See, conduct an unusually severe campaign against the professional societies of the Yugoslav Catholic priests, threatening to interdict and excommunicate them. These societies, it should be remembered, are concerned exclusively with the professional problems of their members, and they are in no way against the interests of the Catholic Church or in contradiction to its canon laws. Nevertheless, they have drawn down upon themselves the wrath of the Vatican only because the priests joining them wish to cooperate with the state in solving their professional problems, and decline to follow the orders of higher Church authorities to come into shar-

per conflict with the state organs and to interfere in the country's political affairs.

The principles upon which the clerical societies rest, such as the care for the material and social position of their members, the participation in various humane activities and the developing of a patriotic attitude towards the country, its integrity and independence, have been approved by a large number of priests in Yugoslavia. So far 16 clerical societies have been formed in the country. The Orthodox priests have their professional societies in five republics, all of which are members of the Federation of the Societies of Orthodox Priests, and the Catholic priests have six: the Cyril-Methodius Society of Slovenia, the Good Shepherd of Bosnia and Hercegovina, the republican societies of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and the society of Istrian priests. There are also three societies of the Moslem clergy, one of the Ancient Catholic priests, called Gregory of Nin with its headquarters in Zagreb, and the society of Protestant ministers. Enrolled in these societies are about 90% of the Orthodox priests, more than 90% of the Moslem clergy, while the number of the Catholic priests joining them is constantly on the increase, despite threats and reprisals from the Vatican and the bishops. The Vatican's intervention in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia, and its pressure on the Catholic priests, went so far that at a conference of bishops in Zagreb last year the forming of clerical societies and joining them was declared to be „Non licet“. But the Catholic priests in Yugoslavia have seen that the political plans of the Holy See have nothing in common with their vocation or with the morals and aims preached by the Church. Most of them have refused to respond to the appeal of the Vatican and high Church authorities to disobey and resist the state organs, to act against the interests of the people, and thus against their own interests as well. The Catholic priests consider that good relations with the people's authorities are necessary, not only in the interests of their own profession, but also for the welfare of the Catholic Church and the community in which they live.

#### THE CYRIL-METHODIUS SOCIETY

What task the professional clergymen's societies have set themselves, and how the Catholic priests, in their majority, view their role and place in their own country, was most clearly shown at a recent conference of the Central



Board of the Cyril-Methodius Societies of the Catholic Priests of Slovenia. This conference was held in Ljubljana on April 22, and attended by the President of the Society, Franc Medvešek, the Secretary of the Society, Professor Janko Žagar, the Guardian of the Pleterije Monastery, Dr. Edgar Leopold, the Professors of the Theological Faculty, Dr. Močnik and Dr. Miklavčič, editors of religious papers, and other prominent priests of Slovenia. Some of the members of the conference gave to press reporters exhaustive replies to questions relating to the activities and aims of the Society.

President Medvešek emphasized that the Society of Slovene Catholic Priests is purely a professional organization, which is concerned with the professional problems of its members. „The Society does not interfere in the affairs of the diocese“, he said. „The chief aim of our organization is to find, in the present social reality, the right place for the priests. The Society is aware that political questions fall within the competence of the political organizations, and we priests, as free citizens can, according to our patriotic feelings, engage in the work of such organizations“. Medvešek also said that more than half of the Slovene priests were members of the Society.

„This is a proof“, he said, „that the priests of our republic, who love the Church and who wish to serve our Catholic Church, show their love and loyalty to their country as well. But our Society has been encountering difficulties from certain Church authorities. These difficulties come from people who do not look with satisfaction upon our reality, our freedom and independence, that is, mostly from enemies in emigration. No one can reproach us for loving, apart from our Church, our country and its freedom“.

In their endeavours to solve their economic problems, the Catholic priests of Slovenia did not find any understanding in their dioceses, which, influenced by the Vatican, sacrificed the interests of the clergy to the political plans of the Holy See. This matter was discussed at the conference by Priest Šmon. He said: „The priests welcome the new law on social insurance, particularly the paragraph which speaks of possibilities for the social insurance of clergymen. We took this matter to our diocesan court, within whose competence it is to settle things of this kind, but we found no understanding there, and therefore the Society itself got in touch with the state authorities with the object of signing an agreement on the social insurance of its members. In Slovenia today 408 Catholic priests are socially insured. According to the statistics of the Society, 184 members have so far benefited from this insurance scheme, mostly in medical treatment, and 27 priests are receiving monthly pensions of 8,000 dinars, as provided for by the agreement.“

#### STATE ASSISTANCE TO RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

The press reporters asked whether the Roman Catholic community received any assistance from the state. Father Lojze Zavkar forwarded the necessary information. He said that the Roman Catholic Church in Slovenia had, since the liberation, received over 95 million dinars in assistance from the state. Of this sum about 61 and a half million dinars have been spent in monthly grants to priests, and over 14 million in the restoration of churches.

Professor Močnik, speaking about the same matter, emphasised that the state had enabled the Theological Faculty to continue work. This Faculty could not have maintained itself when in 1952 it ceased to be a state school. But its work went on, thanks to the assistance of the people's government. Last year the Faculty received a subsidy of two million dinars, and this year this assistance

has been increased to two and a half million. This sum covered all material, personal and other expenditures necessary to maintain the Faculty, in which 94 new students enrolled this year. The students of this Faculty can freely attend lectures, and they encounter no difficulties in their work. They publish their own paper — „Brazda“ (Furrow).

Dr. Jože Premrov, editor of the religious paper, „Brethren“, spoke about the development of the religious press in more detail. He said that his paper was printed in 38,000 copies, and that it was distributed all over Slovenia and other republics, and even sent abroad.

#### VATICAN RADIO AND THE „ASSOCIATION OF CROATIAN CATHOLIC PRIESTS“

Individual Catholic orders freely maintain contact with their centres abroad. The head of the Pleterije Monastery, Dr. Edgar Leopold, said that every year he goes for consultation to France, and that the same can be done by representatives of other orders as well. He mentioned Father Odil Mekinda, who is a representative of the Yugoslav Capuchins in the congregation of the Vatican. Father Odil frequently goes for consultation to the Vatican, with a regular Yugoslav passport.

Many priests at the conference expressed their surprise that Vatican Radio regularly attacks Yugoslavia as a country which keeps the Catholic Church in chains, as a country in which the Church is prevented from maintaining any contact whatsoever with foreign countries. The members of the conference in Ljubljana concluded that the matter is quite otherwise, and that there are few countries in the West in which priests enjoy so much freedom in their religious activities as in Yugoslavia. Graf, a priest from Ptuj, spoke about the activities of the clerical cooperative, which supplies the churches with various articles, many of which are imported from abroad. This cooperative last year issued a calendar printed in 50,000 copies.

Speaking about the campaign against the clerical societies in Yugoslavia, which is directed by the Vatican, Father Tone Ronko mentioned the „Association of Croatian Catholic Priests“ in America, which is a purely political organization of emigrant priests, and which has its branches in many dioceses and even states. This organization was formed only to attack and slander Yugoslavia. It publishes its own paper, which is edited by the emigrant Jesuit, Ivan Nikolić. The paper is political in character, and its editorial office will, it seems, be soon transferred from New York to Rome, where it will come under the control of the notorious ustashi, Krunoslav Draganović, who has been entrusted by the Vatican with the task of directing the anti-Yugoslav campaign. Though this „association“ has not been approved by any church or state, and though it is purely a political organization, neither the Vatican nor anybody else has found it necessary to attack it, but only to assist it.

Discussing the Vatican's attitude, Father Šmon said that in the Vatican greater influence is exerted by those who, through political work, left their country and gave up their religious duties in their parishes, than by those who have remained faithful to their country and their religion and who continue to perform their religious duties and the tasks of the Catholic Church at home.

At the end of the conference, President Medvešek said: „We want to be good priests, faithful to the Church and the country. We want to serve the Catholic Church and help the faithful in their religious life, but we also want to emphasize our patriotism. Our Society fights on behalf of the Church, as our results show, but it also fights for the freedom and independence of our country“.



## One Aspect of the German Problem

**W**ESTERN Germany is without doubt one of the fundamental points in the tangle of international antagonism. She represents an important problem in East-West and intra-European relations, as well as a point in dispute between the USA and West-European countries in their attitude to her. Many social-political and economic processes which are under way, for example various aspects of European integration, are clearly dependent on the attitude and policy of Western Germany. Economically, she has again become a power which has demanded and relatively quickly received the place that belongs to her in world economy. The bounds of her economic strength and her potentialities are now clearly defined. On this are based definite political moves — moves characterized by many elements of uncertainty, as is shown by prudence, caution and in some matters even mistrust in connection with West German relations on the international plane. These circumstances are hindering the settlement of many international issues, they are constantly stirring up animosities. Hence the political and economic moves of Western Germany, as an independent factor of world policy and economy, attract great attention today, as they constitute elements which must be reckoned with in every concrete international action.

### ALLIED POLICY TOWARDS WESTERN GERMANY

The post-war Allied policy towards Western Germany, particularly as regards her economy and her obligation to make adequate compensation of losses caused through aggression and plunder, has passed through two phases. The first phase consisted in restricting Western German economic development and exercising strict control over her industrial output. Demilitarization, denazification, decartelization, the switch-over of her industrial potentialities to peace-time production, as well as the payment of reparations — these were the basic lines of Allied policy in this period. This was aimed at the elimination of Germany as a potential aggressor, as well as a competitor. But changes in the international political situation, the appearance of the USSR as a new strong, aggressive power, the opening of the period of cold war bringing with it a permanent threat to peace in the world, led to the abandonment of this policy towards Western Germany. Under the influence of the formation of blocs and the USA policy, steps were taken towards the rapid establishment of Western Germany as a factor of resistance against the USSR. This change meant a gradual liberation of Germany from the occupational regime, as well as from reparation impositions and burdens. The process accelerated its pace as basic contradictions on the international plane between the USA and the USSR became sharper.

The rise of German economy in this period was a phenomenon which brought about changes in the productive forces on the world market and led to the sharpening of the competition struggle for securing the markets. The liberation of its productive forces meant at the same time a rapid development of the social and political forces which likewise had been kept down till then. Some people are apt to call this development „a miracle of German economy“ because of its rate of progress and results achieved in a few years, while others view it with concern. However, no „miracle“ is involved: this is a development conditioned by realistic factors, whether issuing from the internal forces of German economy freed from obstacles and fetters, or from the concrete international policy towards Western Germany.

### GERMANY'S POSITION AFTER THE FIRST AND AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WARS

In contrast to her situation after the First World War, this time the most unfavourable aspect of Germany's position was her being split into two parts. Economically, she

suffered greater loss than after World War I when Germany was deprived of the territories she had occupied. She was thus deprived of part of the productive forces, especially in agriculture, and a considerable section of the internal market.

The burdening of German economy with reparations was essentially different this time — in volume, duration, method of execution and effect.

At the Yalta conference, the reparations which were to be exacted from Germany were fixed at 20 billion dollars on the basis of 1938 prices. In principle, the agreement was that reparations should be divided between the USSR and the other Allies. In Eastern Germany the Russians fixed this amount and collected most of it. The reparation amount for Western Germany had not been fixed, only the categories of the sources of payment were determined (mercantile marine, dismantling of industrial plants, German assets abroad and restitution of gold) as well as the percentage of share of the individual countries in reparations. This current production was not taken into account for the payment of reparations. It was originally planned to dismantle about 2,000 plants, which would have reduced West Germany's industrial capacity by 20—25%, but from the very beginning the volume of dismantling was cut from time to time, so that in November 1949, when the process of the gradual liquidation of the occupational regime had already set in, it was brought down to 522 plants. The bulk of the metallurgy, machine and chemical industry — the basic industrial branches — were not dismantled at all. West Germany lost only one tenth of her tool machinery; the reduction of her industrial capacity owing to dismantling amounted to only 5%, so that as a whole the industrial capacity in 1947/48 was by 2% greater than in 1936. The deprivation of Germany of her fleet and assets in foreign countries was carried out somewhat more thoroughly. In any case, when the occupational expenses are added to reparations, the burdening of West Germany this time was in absolute disproportion to the devastations, plunder and damage inflicted by German aggression towards other countries. It was a burden for German economy, but it was proportionally far smaller than that economy's actual capacity, which would have been an approximate realization of the compensation claimed by the victims of the Hitlerite aggression. The amount of occupational expenses which Western Germany is still paying is only a small part of her national income. If one bears in mind that since 1948 she has been receiving considerable free assistance from America, then this burden hardly amounts to 5% of her national income. Through Marshall aid, West Germany received 1.5 billion dollars, that is over 6 billion DM. In any case this burden is far smaller than what other countries expend on their defensive forces. This shows that German economy, in comparison with the economy of other countries, is relatively the least burdened with unproductive expenditures. On the other hand, the wage level, especially up to 1951, was such as to provide for very high accumulation, which facilitated a rapid revival of industrial and financial capital.

### RAPID RISE OF WESTERN GERMAN ECONOMY

Here are several characteristic details as an illustration of the rapid rise of German economy.

Industrial production last year was 65% higher than before the war. Bank deposits rose during the last three years by 50% while savings were increased by 144%. The credit volume was increased by 87%. Whereas in 1950 it had no gold reserves, no foreign exchange, while its balance of payments was passive, after 1952 it had a highly active balance of payments and a monetary reserve of over one billion dollars. The West European member-countries of the Payment Union at the end of April this year were in debt to Western Germany for over one billion dollars. Western Germany is gradually re-appearing as an exporter



of capital, thus creating a basis for her further expansion. Her exports are constantly on the increase, and are rising much more rapidly than her imports. The participation of investments in gross production after the monetary reform of 1948 was never below 25% in any one year. The high rate of investments pre-supposes a high level of accumulation, smaller consumption, lower wages and incomes of the working class. Private consumption is smaller than before the war (when average daily consumption expressed in calories was 3,070, while in 1951/52 it was 2,760 or almost 11% less). Through exchange on the world market, owing to the higher export prices fetched for her industrial products and lower import prices for raw materials, Germany has made large profits in recent years. From the middle of 1951 till the autumn last year, the prices of raw materials which she imported fell by 25%, while the prices of her products for export remained mainly unchanged. Had Western Germany paid last year the 1951 prices for her raw materials and food imports, she could not have had an active payment balance. Since that year and even today, she has been giving 1/6 of her export products less for one unit of imported products, in comparison with 1951. In practice even the dollar problem does not exist for her: West German currency is one of the strong currencies; it is nearer to convertibility than the British pound.

The rise of Western German economy makes more acute the problems of its further expansion as well as the contradictions between it and those of other countries. It should be borne in mind that Western Germany has not yet recovered her former position on the world market and that the potential forces of her economic development and her expansion have not yet been fully exploited.

#### DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE SHADOW OF UNCERTAINTY

From the viewpoint of expansion, the German problem presents itself at present in a far sharper form, owing to the division of Germany (which means the limitation of the home market) and also because a considerable part of the market and sources of raw materials have fallen under the hegemony of the USSR, resulting in an aggravation of the uneven development. From this is derived the dominant problem of Western Germany, and also the character and methods of her expansion, as well as the aims and means of her internal and foreign policy.

The demographic and economic conditions in Western Germany are such as to place that country among the leading industrial forces in the world. Before the war, this force was in the hands of the monopoly and the Junkers, whose capital directed it, in conjunction with the state bureaucratic apparatus. What is confusing and alarming today is the existence of a tendency to develop these forces again in both economy and politics. One cannot say that the strength of German monopoly has been destroyed or that forces capable of re-affirming their expansionism have been eliminated; hence danger, apprehension and anxiety are felt.

Many circumstances in the post-war period have brought these forces again to the fore. One was France's attempt to assume the initiative in European policy, although she no longer had the necessary economic strength. She even failed to retain her position in the policy of European integration which was calculated, among other things, to neutralize the effect of German expansion. Another circumstance was a certain lack of interest on the part of Great Britain, except in the settlement of questions directly connected with the danger from German competition. The US policy had primarily in view the need for the strengthening of Western Germany as a counter-action to the USSR. The USSR on the other hand, realizing that it could not extend its control to include Western Germany, endeavoured to strengthen its position in Eastern Germany. Everybody aimed at imposing a definite role

on Germany, in her situation between the two blocs, and particularly in inter-European relations. In view of her potentialities, Western Germany was far above such a subordinated role. The liberation of her productive forces from the control of the occupational regime, which was effected in a comparatively short time and under pressure of clearly political factors, pushed into the background the elements of the policy which aimed at shattering the monopoly, and effecting the decartelization and democratization of German economy.

A separate theme is the role of the working class in the post-war development of Western Germany. Although the working class emerged as a greater and more significant social force, although it succeeded in achieving some significant results, its strength was not so impressive as the strength of the bourgeoisie. The period of strong internal accumulation and the maintenance of the working class standard at a relatively low level were exploited by the bourgeoisie for the reinstatement of its economic position. After this, the bourgeoisie took steps to make some concessions to the working class in the form of improving the living standard. It should be remembered that the bourgeoisie has turned to good account the influx of 11 million refugees, as well as the chronic unemployment, whose figures are in the neighbourhood of 2 millions.

The potential force of Western Germany is a great reserve for the development of world economy. In the period of State monopoly capitalism this force played a negative role. Twice it caused the world war. But it can also play a positive role. Everything depends on what social forces will stand behind it, on whether they be such forces as will seek a solution, through methods and forms, for a juster distribution of national income and the prevention of the concentration of economic and political might in the hands of monopoly. On this also depends the foreign political situation and action of Western Germany and her attitude to questions of international policy. On this depends whether the recent past will at all be taken into consideration, as well as the experiences which call for attention, or how far these experiences will be neglected. The conclusion which Germany was able to draw from two defeats, and particularly the sacrifices and results of her aggressive actions — should be a constant warning to her against neglect in concrete action and attitude, in the choice of means and methods, and in the setting of aims.

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# ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

I DOBRAVEC

## Economy in the U. S. S. R.

THE first signs of the changes which were to take place in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death were manifested in the period prior to that event. They were to be found in the economic discussions in which the economists, Venzher and Sanina, demanded, for the first time in Soviet history, that the means of production in the countryside — tractors, combines and other agricultural machines — should be turned over to the direct producers, the members of the kolkhozes; in the admission that the law of values acts in the Soviet Union, „though in a limited way“; in the criticism of Zhdanov's theory of non-conflict; in the replacing of the theory on the inevitability of conflict between the capitalist and the „socialist“ camps by the assertion that conflicts will break out among capitalist states in the West themselves; in the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, whose recommendations for the five year plan laid special importance on the raising of the standard of living, though earlier plans favoured the development of heavy industry, particularly the production of armaments; in the doctors' plot; in admission that the class struggle still exists in specific forms in the Soviet Union; and the like. It will be of interest to record some facts which have not been over-emphasized in consideration of the said changes.

The nature of the changes in the Soviet Union's foreign policy can easily be determined on the basis of the attitude Moscow maintains and insists upon in concrete contacts with individual states, and on the basis of its views on the important international problems (Germany's rearmament, peace with Austria, collective security in Europe and Asia, Korea, Indo-China, regional defence pacts and so on). The internal changes in the Soviet Union are not known in all their details, and this would be necessary before making a precise evaluation of their importance. The documents which shed some light on these changes (Malenkov's speeches at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet in March 1953 and latter sessions, reports from the plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in July and September 1953 and in February 1954, various decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, decisions of the Government and the Central Committee, press comments, etc.) show that the reforms carried out by the new leaders in no way affect the basic relations in the Soviet Union, and that they are merely a modification of the existing state-capitalist relations, a modification which was necessary to make the economic and state systems more profitable and bring them up to date. Correct information about the internal measures, which were not reported by the press, and about the real relations that followed them in the Party, the state and economic apparatus, would enable us to define, more correctly, the limits of these modifications, and to determine how great an opening they make for a possible awakening and manifestation of more democratic conceptions or even, perhaps, more democratic forms in the state and economic organization. (Here we must bear in mind that state-capitalist relations need not always be manifested in despotic and autocratic forms of a Stalinist type, and that they, too, change in accordance with the material basis.)

But, even without such information we can try to evaluate the tendencies displayed in official documents regarding the internal policy of the Malenkov Government in the past year.

The latest measures of the Soviet Government (the drive for the ploughing of untilled fields, the reorganization of the ministries, the censure of the planning organs) seem to indicate that changes are still taking place, and that the new political and economic policy has not assumed its final shape. This process is particularly obscure in the cultural field, where certain attempts have been made to take a more critical stand towards the practices of the Stalinist period.

In order to make the changes as clear as possible, it is necessary to review briefly the general internal situation in the Soviet Union before Stalin's death.

First of all it must be pointed out that the living standard of the Soviet citizen is very low. According to data from official Soviet sources, real wages are still lower than in 1940, and even then they were not as high as in other European countries. As a result, the Soviet workers and peasants were gradually losing their interest in production; this was best manifested through their apathetic attitude towards work, their careless handling of the state property, and their non-economic use of raw materials, machines and the like. The economic stimulus was then replaced by administrative pressure. This, on one hand, led to the concentration of the management of production in the hands of state organs, and, on the other, to the increasing unproductivity of the administrative staffs in the enterprises. And that was only the beginning of the process of separating the direct producers from the means of production, from the management of economic and state affairs, and from the distribution of the surplus of their labour.

Following the example of the higher bureaucratic organs, the lower bureaucrats also demand a greater share of the surplus of labour than the law permits. Since they cannot increase their incomes, for the salaries determined by the centre are too low, they resort to fraud, making use of state property, which further increases the dissatisfaction of the masses and brings them into conflict with the centre.

But, despite these negative factors, which are characteristic of the post-war Soviet situation, the Soviet Union has built a solid industrial basis. (It has developed its heavy industry and advanced technology, so that it is today capable — though at great cost and effort — to start the experimental production of atomic energy and atomic weapons.)

The successes in the construction of heavy industry projects, in the expansion of raw material and energy bases, communication, transport and supplies of modern machines to agriculture, have contributed to the sharpening of the conflict between the productive forces and social relations, so that these relations will inevitably have to be changed.

On the basis of such economic development there appear definite tendencies which are democratic in character and socialist in aim, as a reaction to the despotic political system in which state-capitalist relations come into full play. These tendencies have originated among the workers



and the progressive sections of the kolkhoz members (since the forcible collectivization and separation of peasants from the means of production — land and agricultural machines — has placed the farmers on an equal footing with the workers). They were most clearly manifested in 1951 and 1952 through the so called Stakhanovite councils, which were set up by the workers with the assistance of the local trade union branches in individual industrially developed regions (Leningrad, Riga, etc.). With the forming of these councils the workers demanded a share in the management of production. Some of these councils went so far as to demand, through their spontaneously adopted statutes, that the workers should control the financial activities of the enterprises, and thus, in a primitive and crude way it is true, touched upon the question of their participation in the distribution and control of the surplus of labour.

In a similar way this tendency was displayed by some kolkhozes in South Russia, when they demanded that tractors and other machines from the machine tractor stations, which are leased to the kolkhozes during tilling seasons, should be placed under the management of the kolkhoz boards. While the demand by the workers was supported only by the local trade union branches, that of the kolkhozes was approved by some economists (Venzher and Sanina), as shown by their proposal that the machines of the machine tractor stations should be placed under the kolkhoz management or given to them altogether.

These demands grew out of practice, and the workers came to insist upon them in an empirical way. As a result the mentioned tendencies bear the stamp of one-sidedness and practicism. Nevertheless, they exist, and it is noteworthy that the said Stakhanovite councils were repeatedly abolished by the local organs of authority and reestablished by the workers, until the sharp intervention of the state organs, inspired by the Central Board of the Soviet Trade Unions and the bureaucratic superiors uprooted them completely. The persistence with which the workers reestablished their dissolved Stakhanovite councils shows how the former strove to acquire even a small part in the management of production. There were some kolkhoz members and agricultural experts, too, who even in 1953 still upheld the demand of the kolkhozes to extend their control over the agricultural machines from the machine tractor stations, during the seasons at least. Stalin himself, as is known, sharply attacked these tendencies in his article: „Some Economic Questions of Socialism in the Soviet Union“.

The attempts of the producers to wrench the means of production from the hands of the bureaucratic administration, and take over the management of production, show that the workers and peasants are becoming increasingly aware of their social position, of their real interests and rights, and that they are trying to find ways and means to realize them. Naturally, these endeavours are still far from producing any concrete results, not only because the bureaucracy, fearing for its own positions, reacts sharply, but also because they are still weak and immature. These endeavours are only the first signs of life of a new class conflict, which is smouldering in the Soviet Union, and which will eventually acquire a definite scope and a livelier tempo.

On viewing things in this light it will be easier to grasp the necessity of the changes the Malenkov Government was compelled to make if it wanted to consolidate, for the time being, at least, existing relations, and protect them from greater shocks. Owing to the workers' and peasants' lack of interest in production, many economic branches in the Soviet Union, particularly agriculture and light industry, are stagnant, and in some cases alarming decreases in production were recorded (livestock breeding, fruit and vegetable growing, timber industry establishments, etc.). The increase in the number of office workers in state and economic organizations raised bureaucratic parasitism to great proportions (in some enterprises the number of office workers is equal to the number of workers). This, too, proved to be an obstruction to production, simply because such large administrative staffs, sunk deep in bureaucratic inertia, are incapable of organizing the enterprises. And so, even the little interest in production, which the workers, influenced by socialist phraseology, still had, disappeared in their conflict with the inertia of the economic bureaucracy. (Most of the proposals workers give for the rationalization and improvement of production end on directors' desks, without any steps being taken to investigate them).

After Stalin's death the new Soviet leaders effected some changes in their internal policy, the aim of which

was, first, to increase the interest of the producers in production (by lowering taxes in agriculture, giving higher prices for the agricultural products which farmers are obliged to deliver to the state, by decreasing the volume of such deliveries, by supplying greater quantities of consumer goods at lower prices, and by increasing real wages) and, secondly, to reorganize the state administration so as to break up its inertia and enable it to increase the productivity in the enterprises (by reducing the number of office workers, many of whom, particularly agricultural experts, were transferred to new posts in the villages, where they were needed most, by decentralizing gradually the economic management, transferring functions from higher to lower organs, etc.).

The most important thing in the new policy of the leading Soviet circles is, undoubtedly, the intention to raise the living standard of the masses, which was expressed in measures for increasing agricultural and consumer goods' production. All this was necessary and inevitable, seeing that the standard of living of the Soviet citizen is too low, and that there is a great disproportion between heavy and light industry. But these measures would never have been contemplated if the Soviet Union had not achieved certain successes in the construction of key industries, which have enabled the bureaucratic leaders to make certain changes in their economic policy, without any fear for their own positions.

But the provision of investments and the engagement of experts are in themselves not enough to ensure success in the carrying out of the new Soviet economic policy. What is needed is a change in the relations of the producers towards work. The concessions which have been made are too small to induce the workers and peasants to try to increase the productivity of their labour. Therefore the leaders of the Soviet Union will have to provide material benefits for the working people, if they are to arouse their interest in production, and that can best be done by enabling them to participate in the distribution of the surplus of labour. This is, in fact, the desire of the workers and peasants, who are knocking on the door of the bureaucracy and demanding their historic rights.

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DR VIKTOR NOVAK

Professor of Belgrade University

## Historical Survey of Vatican-South Slav Relations

### ON THE APPEARANCE OF THE BOOK „VATICAN-YUGOSLAVIA“

THE supreme institution of the Catholic church in Rome, whether called the Lateran, Vatican, the Holy or Apostolic See, the Curia Romana, the Supreme Pontiff, Pontifex Maximus, Pappas the Father, or simply the Pope, has written many pages in the history of the South Slav peoples since the early Middle Ages.

The historical span of the Vatican relations towards our peoples during their entire history in the Balkans is not only long, but also extremely complex. Often these relations tend to seem rather confusing at first sight, but in the long run it becomes clear that they have invariably exercised an adverse influence on the fate of the Yugoslav peoples. This process of development, which has gone on for thirteen and half centuries, is marked by many events in the history of the Yugoslav peoples which bear the imprint of the Vatican. The centuries-old sequence of events in this branch of history abounds in seemingly contradictory but essentially the same unchanging political aspirations of Rome, even when they have assumed a purely ecclesiastical and religious guise.

The first Latin reports on the Slavs, who during the concluding stages of the Great Migration, at the end of the sixth and beginning of the seventh century, and in full accordance with the laws of history, began settling in their new homeland (the broad Balkan regions of the former Roman Illyria, which was divided as early as the fourth century into Eastern and Western Illyria, with capitals in Rome and Constantinople), originated from the offices of the Roman Pontiff. It should be said at once that these reports were not in the least favourable to the Slavs. This was only natural, in view of the fact that although the Pope was still not the head of a secular state at that time, as was to be the case two centuries later, his political prestige already went far beyond the walls of Rome and the limits of Italy proper. Thus, thanks to historical circumstance, the Pope had already become the wealthiest and greatest landowner as well as the supreme ecclesiastical leader of religion which, for many reasons aspired to become universal and exclusive. The means for the achievement of this far-reaching and ambitious goal were not always exclusively religious, evangelical or apostolic. On the contrary they were often military, violent, cruel, ruthless, inquisitory and crusading and, as such, directed not only against the infidels in the East but the Christian heretics in Europe as well. Although the church was very proud of its principle: „ecclesia non sitit sanguinem“ (the church does not thirst for blood), it did not shrink from using the entirely secular methods of fire and sword to keep people under its domination and punish those who dared interpret the New Testament in their own way, or adopt a critical attitude towards the church prelates and their profligacy, or their completely secular ideas regarding their duties and position, which were in complete contradiction to the basic commandments of the Gospels.

In Rome itself, during the momentous developments which preceded and followed the fall of the Roman Empire in the course of the fifth and sixth centuries A. D., and which took place throughout the former Roman territories in Europe (it is sufficient to recall some of the prime movers in these events — Alaric the Visigoth, Geyseric the Vandal, Attila the Hun, Odoacer leader of the Germanic legions in the Roman army, Clovis the Frank, Theodoric the Ostrogoth, Justinian of Byzantium, Alboin and his successors of the Lombards), the Pope gradually became the

representative of the Roman people, both in Rome proper and in the entire duchy of Rome (which consisted of Latium and Southern Etruria). It was already obvious at this juncture that the former imperial authority in Rome was being replaced by that of the Pope.

It is hence understandable that the Roman pontiff of that time viewed current development in the light of the political interests of the church he headed. Thus he never failed to anathemise all the barbarian religions, whether polytheistic, or „heretically“ Christian, as was Gothic Arianism. However the process which marked the creation of a new structure of Europe, entirely different from that of the former Roman Empire could not now be arrested. Meanwhile Pope Gregory I, who was not named the Great without reason, viewed the Slavs from the same pontifical standpoint. Gregory I was the famous Pope and statesman who left sufficient directives in his writings to provide the basis for the long-range political conceptions which guided the papacy through world history. He developed the idea promulgated by Pope Leo I of the Roman Pontiff as supreme head of Universal Christian Church, while this conception was soon to receive official sanction from the emperor, who invested the Pope with the title Rector Universalis by imperial edict. Apart from this, Pope Gregory I was extremely successful both where the sacerdotium and the imperium were concerned, or, to be more precise, in the acquisition of secular power over the European Christians, over the states and their rulers. Gregory succeeded in enlisting the Goths and Lombards in the Catholic cause, converted the Anglo-Saxons, and brought the self-willed Frankish episcopate more firmly under his control. This not only enhanced the prestige of the Roman Pontiff, but it also extended his influence to vast areas of the Europe of that time, and gave rise to the conviction that only faithful Catholic peoples could develop in this new Europe, which was gradually emerging from the ruins of the Roman Empire. Consequently all newcomers to the European political scene who stubbornly persisted in ignoring this cultural and historical imperative were either forced to withdraw, or eventually to submit to this new medieval power. Nothing could change the essence of Pope Gregory's aspirations to secular power, not even the fact that he christened himself „servus servorum dei“ (the servant of the servants of God) as distinct from the title, of ecumenical and universal patriarch, assumed by his rival in Constantinople. One should always bear in mind that the magistral Rome-Constantinople was already more or less clearly delineated at this time, and already contained all the inherent contradictions and conflicts which were to lead to such serious consequences in the course of history. Thus the supreme representative of medieval Catholicism viewed with concern the new danger which appeared with the immigration of the Slavs in the former Roman Illyria. His misgivings were not unfounded, as his forebodings regarding the further course of development proved right, because the Southern Slavs showed little or no understanding of the ideas of the Roman pontiffs and their endeavours to restore the Roman Empire, which later coincided completely with the aspirations of Charlemagne and the Emperor Otto. The Curia Romana was to become the trusted ally of the Frankish and German imperialists. Consequently the Slav endeavours to achieve their own interests and objectives, especially when they succeeded in forming their own states, were to come into serious and prolonged conflict with the interests of



the Curia Romana. The interests of the latter were, however, always congruent with the political conceptions and actions of the age-old foes of the Southern Slavs as all these conceptions precluded the existence of the Slav peoples in the Balkans, particularly when these peoples began grouping themselves into states.

This is how the unfavourable appraisal made by the Roman pontiff over thirteen and a half centuries ago regarding the Slavs who had already drawn the final ethnical limits of their new country, should be interpreted. This hostile attitude was to remain essentially unchanged, and is still manifested through various denationalising activities to this very day.

In 599 Gregory expressed his satisfaction and gladness to the Byzantine exarch, Calinices, in Ravenna, for the latter's successes in driving the Slovenes and Croats towards the Alps. However, his „magna laetitia“ was somewhat dampened in 600 by the Slav successes in the fights along the Italian frontiers. The Pope was then „afflictio and conturbatio“ (afflicted and perturbed), because, in his own words, the Slav advance was now proceeding unchecked towards the gateway of Italy.

These contradictory sentiments of Gregory I were to constitute an unbroken thread in the pattern of Yugoslav history up to the present day. Rome has always rejoiced when the Slavs suffered, and grieved when they were successful and prosperous. This was not only the case when the Slavs were pagans. Their pre-Christian period is recalled by many survivals of ancient pagan customs, which were preserved in the subsequent period of Christianity, as the new religion was unable to eradicate them completely. Today there still survive two toponyms, as a memento of these pre-Christian times. One is the name of a hill near Lovran in Istria, and the other the name of the peak of the Mosor mountain of Mosor near Split, which are both named after the supreme Slav deity, Perun. It is most likely that this deity also had his shrine on the mountain top, while it is practically certain that it stood there until the end of the eighth century, when the old temple of Jupiter in the Diocletian palace was converted into a Christian church. Thus Perun and Jupiter both finally disappeared from Dalmatia by the end of the eighth century, to be replaced by Christ and St. Dujam.

These contradictory sentiments of Gregory I became the lasting heritage of all Popes who had to deal with the Slav Christians in the Balkans. At that time the Pontifex Maximus of the Roman Church was already the actual ruler of a secular state, whose creation was largely due to the circumstances which governed the relationship of the Frankish usurper of the throne towards the Pope, as the latter aided the founder of the Carolingian dynasty, through his ecclesiastical and political prestige, to overthrow the Merovingian dynasty and seize the throne. The next Frankish king, Pepin the Short, not only repaid the Church by gifts in land and gold, but also lavishly rewarded the papacy for his legal investiture, by the creation of a state which consisted of parts of the Duchy of Rome and the cities which the defeated Lombards were forced to hand over to the Pope as the price of peace. Thus the Lombards, the Pope and the Franks created a state which was to last until 1870 (by seizures of territory from the legitimate heir of the Roman Empire, i. e., the Byzantine Emperor). Hence it came to pass that usurped royal power, legalized by papal authority and ecclesiastical authority supported by the awards of an anointed king, became close allies, and devoted themselves to the same task.

The joint Carolingian and papal rise to power in the second half of the seventh century represented a new historical factor which would later assume full proportions as regards its complex imperialist interests, both towards Byzantium and the Balkan peoples. Pepin and Charlemagne fostered the interests of Rome, and Rome conducted its missionary work among the Slavs, on behalf of the Franks. The aggressive military and political expansionism of the Frankish rulers coincided with the conversion of larger parts of the Balkans to Christianity, particularly its eastern parts. The path of the Frankish sword was smoothed by the cross of the missionaries from Rome, Aquileia and Salzburg. The activities of Constantinople in this respect were of later date and marked a new stage in the conversion of the Balkans, when the expelled disciples of the Slav teachers, Cyril and Method, found asylum in the South Slav territories in their flight from Moravia.

The reorganisation of the old Solin hierarchy in Dalmatia, which was carried out by the end of the eighth century under the leadership of John of Ravenna, was inspired by Rome and enjoyed the full support of Charle-

magne. This reorganisation provided the necessary basis for the further penetration of Christianity among the Slavs emanating from the old Dalmatian cities, either restored or newly founded during the Migration, such as Split and Dubrovnik. A thirteenth century Chronicler, Thomas the Archdeacon of Split, writes of the peaceful symbiosis of the Slavs and the remaining Romans in these cities, which was conditioned by the economic circumstances which prevailed at that time. The date of this reorganisation should certainly not be set as far back as the beginning of the eighth century, and still less the seventh century, as is done by certain Yugoslav ecclesiastical historians. The first tangible relic from this period is still preserved in the atrium of the Yugoslav Academy of Art and Science. It is the baptistery of Duke Višeslav of Nin and dates from the late eighth century.

The conversion of the alpine Slovenes to Christianity was carried out under the guidance of the Salzburg centre, which served as a springboard for the Franks in their penetration into the Slovene territories. After the death of the first Christian Slovene Duke, Gorazd (in 753), a wave of popular pagan reaction swept the country, but it was soon quelled by the Bavarians. The oldest Slovene church, in the field of Gospasveta in Carinthia, is one of the most famous relics of this period. The Bavarian feudal aristocracy erased all traces of paganism by fire and sword, and aided their protégé and follower, the Christian Volkun, to rule the Slovenes (772—784). Volkun not only opened up the country to German missionaries, but also made possible the penetration of German merchants, tradespeople, and peasants who had long been attracted by the well-cultivated Slovene lands. Thus we already find the first traces of Germanization, which was later fostered by all possible means in these manifestly Slovene areas, and the infiltration of the Germanic element among the purely Slovene population. Meanwhile the Slovenes were exposed to the activities of another centre, in Aquileia this time, which spread Romanization parallel with Christianity. It was on Slovene soil that the first conflicts between the Roman and the German missionaries occurred. This conflict was settled in 811 by Charlemagne, who divided these territories by placing one part under the jurisdiction of the Salzburg centre, and the other under that of Aquileia, taking the Drava river as the demarcation line between the two dioceses. Needless to say the conflict did not arise only from a desire to save Slovene souls, but from the wish to secure as much land as possible from which could be collected the tithes which were paid at that time by many Christians to their ecclesiastical landowners, whose soil they tilled. It was not without reason that the eminent Anglo-Saxon, Alcuin, wrote to Bishop Arno of Salzburg in 796, asking him to see to it that his clergymen be preachers of truth, and not plunderers of tithes, „sint praedicatores, non praedatores“.

The various Serbian tribes also embraced Christianity very early doubtless concurrently with the Croats. The first missionaries to Serbia came from Rome, and only later from Constantinople — at the time of the already mentioned disciples of Cyril and Method.

It should be mentioned however that, until the advent of the latter, Christianity did not penetrate deeply among the Southern Slavs, and was embraced only by the upper strata of their society, complete success being achieved only towards the end of the ninth century. Greek and Latin in the church services were then replaced by old Slavic, while the new orthography, the so-called „glagolitsa“, penetrated into the liturgy and education in general. While the Macedonians, Serbs and Montenegrins gradually acquired independence and formed their own autonomous church, the other Southern Slavs, i. e., the Croats and Slovenes, remained under the wing of Rome and retained the Latin service. The work of the disciples of Cyril and Method was not, however, without result in a large part of Croatia, where glagolitic was adopted and introduced in the church service, while the people struggled against the Roman prelates for its preservation and equal use with Latin. Thus by the end of the ninth and the beginning of the tenth century glagolitic spread rapidly over the vast littoral areas and into Istria, embracing all the islands and penetrating deeply into the mainland. The Croat use of glagolitic soon clashed with the Roman use of Latin, which was ruthlessly and relentlessly promulgated by the Solin-Split hierarchy, headed by the metropolitan in Split. The Croat part of the Catholic church was first limited to its centre in Nin, but later spread to Knin and its vicinity. The use of Latin also enjoyed the support of the rapidly disappearing elements of the old Romanism, which was being replaced by a new and imported Romanism, in



the form of Venetian trade and its political and imperialistic penetration towards the Eastern coast of the Adriatic, which lasted for many centuries, until the downfall of the „Queen of the Adriatic“ in 1797.

Leaving aside the development of Christianity in the Eastern territories of the Southern Slavs, we will dwell for a moment on the western areas inhabited by the Croats and Slovenes, as the former were less exposed to Roman influence. This does not necessarily imply that it was never felt in these countries, for the contrary was the case, particularly towards the end of the reign of Stevan Prvovenčani, and till the advent of the Emperor Dušan, i. e., from the beginning of the thirteenth century to the end of the fourteenth. Mutual relations between Rome and the South Slavs exercised a more or less permanent influence on the western part of the Balkans, both in the religious and the political life of their peoples. The political and religious aspirations of Rome were fulfilled not only through the high officials in Rome, the Pope and his co-workers in the Curia Romana, the cardinals and other prelates in the various congregations, but also through their organized hierarchy in the Yugoslav Christianized areas. Thus all the directions, recommendations, decisions, benedictions or maledictions of the Vatican or Lateran were promptly carried out in even the smallest and most remote Christian community in the Balkans, through the metropolitans, bishops and other prelates, the larger and smaller dioceses, the higher and lower clergy, the monastic orders such as the Benedictines, Franciscans, Dominicans, Cistercians and lastly by the Jesuits in the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Through church sermons, books, schools, homes, guilds and other social institutions, which were all permeated by the medieval spirit of the church and its organisation, the church strengthened both its spiritual and political power. From the thirteenth century onwards, the Inquisition took care to penetrate most intimately, not only into public life but into private life also, and particularly dominated society by its ubiquitous terror, the classes subjected to the exploitation of both the ecclesiastical and the secular feudalists.

The history of the Yugoslav peoples clearly indicates that the papacy, both directly and indirectly, supported the Carolingians, the Arpad dynasty, the Venetian doges, as well as the Habsburgs, the margraves and other German princes, even when purely secular matters were at stake. The interests of these factors and their imperialistic expansionism coincided with those of Rome. Perhaps the feelings and attitude of the Roman Pontiffs towards the Southern Slavs were most eloquently and vividly revealed by the epithets they used when they had cause to be vexed by the Slavs. Thus all the disobedient Croats were „sea robbers“ (*latrunculi marini*) to Pope John VIII (in 875), while according to Pope John X the language they sought to introduce into their church service was „barbarian“ (*barbara slavinica lingua*). To Gregory VII (1075) the Slavs were „savage and lazy heretics“ (*viles et ignavi haeretici*), while Lucius III (1185) did not spare the Yugoslav peoples and accused them of being detractors of the holy Roman church, disruptors of ecclesiastical laws, robbers and plunderers of church land and the income of clergymen“ (*sanctae romanae ecclesiae oblaterantes, ecclesiastici officii verberatores, terrarum redituumque ecclesiastiarum raptores, invasores, retentores*). Honorius II (1221) was not much more friendly when he declared that all Slavs were pirates, and that they were „crafty, seditious, heretical as witches with naked breasts, perfidious and subversive“ (*piratica rabies, vulpes, rebelles, haeretici velut lamiae cum nudatis mammis, perfidi subversores*). Gregory IX (1234—1236) was likewise shocked by the „perfidy of the Slav heretics“ and the „duplicity of the Bosnians“, (*perfidia haereticorum Sclavoniae, perfida natio Bosnensium*). The Slavs were „transgressors and bandits“ to Nicholas II (1280). Boniface VIII regarded Slavonia as a „pestilential menace of heretic evil“ (*latifera pestis haereticae depravitatis*). To John XXII (1319) Bosnia was „the cradle of heresy polluted by infidelity“ (*terra Bosniensis patria haereticorum ac infidelitatis labe polluta*). To Clement VI (1351) the Bosnians were „enemies of the Christian faith, and sons of iniquity“ (*fidei christianae adversi, iniquitatis filii*), while Gregory XI (1383) simply branded all Slav countries and the whole of Slavonia as the country of schismatics, heretics and other infidels (*terrae schismaticorum, aliorumque infidelium*). Pope Pius II considered the kingdom of Bosnia to be polluted by heretics (*regnum Bosniae haereticis et schismaticis inquinatum*) while the Bosnians were merely „pestiferous people“ (*pestilentes homines*) to the cardinal and chief inquisitor, Torquemada (1461). These epithets continued in the same vein right up to the twentieth century, when,

among other examples, Pope Pius X (August 27, 1913) called all the Slav peoples who had succeeded in liberating themselves from the Turks in 1913, barbarians (*sono tutti quanti barbari*). Such attitudes make the statements of Hadrian VI and Leo X, who referred to the Slavs as „antemurale christianitatis“, all the more dubious and vague, the more so as the Slavs constituted an actual outpost of European civilisation, which was defended by Slav blood, and to whom all Europe owes an immense debt for her peaceful development, Venice, Italy and papal Rome being among the most indebted.

In the ninth century when Frankish predominance began weakening, the Croatian duke, Zdeslav, attempted to overthrow the Frankish authority and to this end joined forces with Byzantium in 878. This was all the more dangerous at that time as it suggested the possibility that the Croat Church would join the Constantinople patriarchy, which was then headed by the eminent Fotius. In order to prevent the loss of this extremely important sector of its ecclesiastical and political sphere of interests, Rome resorted to all possible means to overthrow Zdeslav, and to aid the opposing party. The assassination of Zdeslav and the inauguration of Duke Branimir was blessed by the Pope in 879 in the church of St. Peter, where the Pope promised to aid Branimir in the struggle against his enemies. It became obvious however, that the Croats would provoke the disapproval of the Pope as soon as they showed the slightest tendencies contrary to the views of the Curia Romana. Similar differences of opinion with Rome were caused by the already mentioned use of the Slav language and alphabet in the performance of sacred rites. In spite of the fact that the Popes had already previously sanctioned the use of Old Slavic in the churches of the Moravians and Pannonian Slavs (from 863 to 885), they later condemned it in Dalmatia and other parts of the Adriatic, as they feared that Croatia might side with Byzantium one day, especially if the link of a common language in the church existed. Rome resolutely opposed Croat glagolitic when it was discussed at the ecclesiastical congresses in Split, which were held from 925 to 928, and likewise resisted all attempts to invest the diocese of Nin under Bishop Gregory with greater autonomy and thus make it independent of the Latin metropolitan in Split. Both the papal legates of Pope John X and the Dalmatian Latinists and their clergy were opposed to this. The latter pontiff is better known for his dissolute life and the numerous misdeeds he committed, than for his work as a preacher and protector of the gospels, and it is thus understandable that he was unable to find anything in his sacred books regarding Method, and consequently also ignored the characters granted to the latter by Popes Hadrian II and John VIII.

The following instructions from Rome determined the attitude of most Latinists and pro-Latinists (i. e. the Croat adherents of Latin church service) at these congresses: neither can the use of the Slovene language, nor the independence of the Nin Croat diocese be permitted.... It was thus decided in Split and confirmed in Rome. However the Croat followers of glagolitic did not conform to these decisions. This marked the beginning of a struggle between the Croats and Rome for the preservation of their cultural heritage, which continued in various forms until the twentieth century. The excommunications with which the Croats were threatened in the tenth century if they failed to obey the decisions of the congress were often repeated in the eleventh century, particularly when the Curia Romana began openly striving for the reformation and purging of the church from all elements which had not only led to her decline in Western Europe, but which jeopardized her full domination over all secular authority and rulers of states. In her efforts to centralize the entire hierarchy and the church rites, the question of a universal and uniform tongue, inevitably appeared on the agenda. Consequently glagolitic and particularly Old Slavic, were condemned to disappear. For if it was demanded of the Spaniards to renounce their own particular type of minuscule, which was incorrectly called Visigoth, — in spite of the fact that it was purely Latin tongue — with the aim of achieving a uniform language in which sacred books could be written, it was still more imperative that the Croats should abandon glagolitic. As the Spanish exponents of the Curia Romana eradicated this version of the minuscule, by the deliberate untruth that it was of Visigoth, hence Arian origin, this untruth was also used against glagolitic by the allegation that Method was a heretic inventor of Gothic letters, and hence an Arian.

(To be continued)



# CALENDAR OF DIPLOMATIC AND SOCIAL EVENTS

## EVENTS IN YUGOSLAVIA

April 24. — The Head of the Carinthian Regional Government, Herr Ferdinand Wedenigg, arrived in Ljubljana on a friendly visit.

April 24. — The Salesian priest from Chile, Bogdan Metlika, who has been on a visit to Yugoslavia for three months, made a statement about the freedom of religion in Yugoslavia.

April 24. — President Tito accepted letters of credit from the new Egyptian Minister, Mr. Hussein Roushdy.

April 26. — The State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Koča Popović received the new Norwegian Minister Mr. Irgens.

April 26. — In the national theatre in Belgrade the title role in the opera „Madame Butterfly“ was interpreted by the prima donna of the Ankara Opera, Leyla Genchar.

April 27. — President Tito submitted a report on his visit to friendly Turkey, at a meeting of the Federal Executive Council.

April 29. — President Tito sent a message of congratulation to Queen Juliana on the occasion of the Dutch national holiday.

April 29. — President Tito received members of the Ethiopian military delegation.

April 30. — A group of Burmese journalists arrived on a visit to Yugoslavia where they will spend 25 days.

April 30. — President Tito agreed to the appointment of the new Iranian Minister to Belgrade, Mr. Mohsen Medhata.

May 3. — Emperor Hirohito thanked President Tito for his congratulations on the occasion of the Japanese national holiday.

May 3. — The head of the Turkish military delegation, General Haki Tunaboylu, declared that he was very much impressed by the May Day military march past in Belgrade and declared that the „Yugoslav Army is a great guarantee for peace in the Balkans“. Similar statements were made by the military representatives of Greece, France, the USA, Great Britain and Burma.

May 5. — Wagner's opera, „The Flying Dutchman“ was given in the Belgrade National Theatre for the first time.

May 6. — President Tito sent a telegram of condolence to the King Paul of the Hellenes in connection with the earthquake in Thessaly.

May 7. — President Tito sent a message of congratulation to Mr. Isaac Ben Zwi on the occasion of the Israeli national holiday.

May 7. — A group of Finnish journalists arrived in Belgrade. They will spend about 15 days in Yugoslavia.

May 8. — The international congress for hydroclimatology and balneology began work in Opatija. It was attended by 194 Yugoslav and 220 foreign scientists.

May 9. — Professor Georges Vedel of the Paris Faculty of Law gave two lectures at the Law Faculty in Belgrade.

May 10. — Mr Dobrivoje Radosavljević, President of the Federal Commission for Religious Questions received Mr Raymond Maxwell, the Secretary of the Ecumenical Council of Churches for the Balkans.

May 10. — Mr John Colligan, the Secretary of the Institute for the Blind in London, arrived in Yugoslavia for a fortnight's visit.

May 11. — M. Jean Sarail, President of the University Council in Paris, arrived in Sarajevo.

May 12. — The Yugoslav Red Cross decided to send aid to a value of one million dinars to the earthquake sufferers in Greece.

May 12. — It was announced in Belgrade that the misunderstanding with the French Government in connection with the payment of pre-war debts has been resolved.

May 12. — Dr Mladen Iveković, Yugoslav Ambassador in Western Germany arrived in Belgrade for regular consultations.

May 14. — A spokesman of the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs declared at the press conference that a settlement of the Trieste issue was possible only on the basis of the recognition of the interests and rights of both sides.

May 14. — Mr Edvard Kardelj, Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council, received Mr Irgens, the Norwegian Minister. Later he also received the Egyptian Minister, Mr. Roushdy.

## YUGOSLAVIA AND THE WORLD

April 24. — Dr Mladen Iveković, The Yugoslav Ambassador in Western Germany, visited Herr Blankenhorn, the State Counsellor in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bonn, and lodged a protest against the removal of a scheduled article written by Mr Moša Pijade, the President of the National Assembly, from the programme of the Munich radio station.

April 25. — An agreement was signed in Sofia between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on the method of examination and settlement of frontier incidents.

April 27. — A Yugoslav economic delegation headed by Mr Jakov Blažević, a member of the Federal Executive Council, arrived in Rio de Janeiro.

May 1. — A Yugoslav-Ethiopian Club which will work on the deepening of friendly ties between the two countries was founded in Addis Abeba.

May 4. — A session of the World Health Organization, attended also by a Yugoslav delegation, opened in the Palace of Nations in Geneva.

May 4. — Dr. Jože Brilej, Ambassador in the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, was appointed permanent Yugoslav representative in UNO.

May 4. — The Yugoslav-Turkish agreement on air traffic entered into force.

May 4. — An agreement was reached in Bonn on the postponement of the meeting of Yugoslav liabilities towards Western Germany.

May 7. — Mr Milentije Popović, President of the Committee for Economy of the Federal National Assembly, visited the Indian Premier, Mr. Nehru, who entertained him to lunch.

May 8. — The West German Government expressed regret to the Yugoslav Government in connection with the removal of Moša Pijade's article from the programme of Munich Radio.

May 9. — Mr Radoš Jovanović, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Athens, in an interview to the Salonika paper „Elinikos vorasu“ emphasized the significant all-round progress in Greco-Yugoslav relations.

May 10. — Mr Milentije Popović, President of the Committee for Economy, attended a meeting of parliament in New Delhi.

May 11. — The Yugoslav economic delegation visited Sao Paulo, where it was the guest of the Association of Industrialists.

May 12. — On leaving New Delhi for Rangoon, the Yugoslav delegate to the session of the Bureau of the Asian Socialist Conference declared that Yugoslavia was interested in cooperation with India, with which she has many common interests.

May 13. — The National Museum in Belgrade has sent a collection of old Yugoslav coins and books on numismatics as a gift to the Numismatic Society in Mexico City. The gift was delivered to the Society by the Yugoslav Embassy in Mexico.



# Review of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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
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